

SEPTEMBER 22, 2008

The American Conservative

How to Start a War:

- ✓ Find Stick
- ✓ Poke Bear
- ✓ Yell, "We are all Georgians!"*


* John McCain
Aug. 12, 2008



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Firstborns are born to win.

Being born first is not up to you.
But taking advantage of it is.



Join bestselling author, humorist, and internationally known psychologist Dr. Kevin Leman as he shows how to put your firstborn tendencies to work for you. Learn how to:

- take advantage of being a firstborn
- overcome the perfectionism that holds you back
- relate to others who are not firstborn
- and much more

“

His spirited and exceptionally easy read will appeal to those readers interested in understanding better whence they came and how to move forward with success.”

—*Publishers Weekly*

Dr. Kevin Leman is the bestselling author of *The Birth Order Book* and has more than 3.5 million books in print. His newest book, *Have a New Kid by Friday*, has more than 100,000 copies in print in just two months. He is also the author of *Making Children Mind without Losing Yours* and *Sex Begins in the Kitchen*.



a division of Baker Publishing Group
www.RevellBooks.com



[STRATEGY]

What Russia Wants

BY TED GALEN CARPENTER Not world empire—just respect Page 6

[ALLIES]

Bloom Off the Rose

BY JOHN LAUGHLAND The myth of democratic Georgia Page 8

[IDEAS]

Free World Colossus

BY LEE CONGDON America's new revolutionary wars Page 11

[ELECTION]

Maternal Flame

BY STEVE SAILER Sarah Palin and the new breed of politics Page 14

[WORLD]

Four More Years

BY TONY SMITH Whoever wins the election, the Bush Doctrine marches on.
Page 20

COLUMNS

- 13 Patrick J. Buchanan:** Russian Roulette
27 Daniel Larison: Veep choices show us the candidates' worst traits
35 Bill Kauffman: Baseball in Batavia

NEWS & VIEWS

- 4 Fourteen Days:** The Palin Pivot; Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?; Thailand's Top Chef
17 Deep Background: America Bugs Maliki; McCain's Surprise Party

ARTICLES

- 16 Michael Brendan Dougherty:** Ward Connerly cashes in on affirmative action.
19 Daniel McCarthy: No room for Ron Paul in McCain's big tent
24 R.J. Stove: Bush's pet historian

ARTS & LETTERS

- 28 Steve Sailer:** Diane English's "The Women"
29 Scott McConnell: *The New Case Against Immigration: Both Legal and Illegal* by Mark Krikorian
31 Walter M. Hudson: *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America* by Rick Perlstein
33 Septimus Waugh: *The Sixties Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade* by Gerard DeGroot



[ELECTION]

DUX FEMINA FACTI

If John McCain wins in November, analysts will mark this fortnight as the Palin Pivot. It's conventional wisdom that a vice-presidential pick isn't decisive, but this time the wags may be wrong. Not only did the It Girl from Alaska invigorate the Republican base, she sent the Democrats into a disarray from which they haven't recovered.

Once he secured the nomination, Obama's road seemed smooth. He had money to burn, a besotted media, and an opponent barely able to read from a teleprompter. All that remained was for him to ride down Pennsylvania Avenue and claim his prize.

Enter Sarah Palin. Seemingly overnight, Obama's star dimmed: his fundraising slowed, his poll numbers suffered, and McCain-Palin (Palin-McCain?) began packing stadiums.

This is no usual convention bounce. A *Washington Post*/ABC poll reveals that white women have moved from 50-42 percent in Obama's direction to 53-41 for McCain. Furthermore, in the battleground Midwest, the Republican candidate has turned a 19-point deficit into a 7-point edge. According to Gallup, McCain is up 15 points among independents. The critical factor: a hockey mom who's winning the hearts of Middle America. According to CNN/Opinion Dynamics, in a head-to-head match-up, she beats Joe Biden 53 to 44 percent.

Had Obama chosen Hillary Clinton, Republican strategist Ed Rollins argues, McCain probably wouldn't have picked Palin. At best, any of the other names on

his shortlist would have produced a shrug from the ranks, a lackluster convention, and Obama would be on his way. But Palin is a game changer. She may not deliver the election—it's still a long way from over—but there's little chance McCain could have competed without her.

[ECONOMY]

NO LENDER LEFT BEHIND

Imagine getting together with several friends to place a big wager on the roulette wheel. Everything on a single number. If you lose, as is almost certain, you'll learn a painful lesson about gambling. But what if you get your stake back, whatever number comes up? You'll keep gambling—and keep calling most of the shots wrong. Eventually, the casino will go broke.

Nobody gets that kind of privilege in Las Vegas—not even Bill Bennett. But if you and your friends happen to be corporations, and your money is riding on government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, you can count on a bailout from Uncle Sam. That's what happened on Sept. 7, when the Bush administration announced it was taking over the embattled mortgage giants. The public will pay—perhaps to the tune of \$250 billion.

The *New York Times* acknowledges that this "extraordinary federal intervention in private enterprise ... could become one of the most expensive financial bailouts in American history," but assures worried readers that "it will not involve any immediate taxpayer loans or investments." Yet sooner or later we will

have to pay, if not directly through loans then indirectly through the Federal Reserve's printing presses.

Fannie and Freddie control over \$5 trillion in mortgage debt. Justifying the takeover, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson warned that their collapse "would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation."

Yet that economic growth and job creation has been financed by bad debt. By bailing out the creditors, the administration provides an incentive for more malinvestment in the future—giving more loans to more unqualified would-be homeowners. The result will be an even greater burden on the lenders of last resort—American taxpayers. \$250 billion may be only the beginning.

Sooner or later, the pyramid will collapse, and the longer the contraction is put off, the worse the correction will be. Of course, Bush and Paulson prefer to defer the harm until someone else is in office, but that's the worst possible course. The problem is not debt but responsibility, something the federal government can only destroy.

[WAR]

SURGE SYNDROME

At last, Bush has announced a withdrawal from Iraq. Have Iraq's warring factions reconciled? Not really. Has the Maliki government attained legitimacy or competence? No comment.

Having achieved none of its stated goals, the surge has worked. And to

prove it, Bush is bringing home a whopping 5 percent of America's troops, leaving the other 138,000 soldiers in Iraq for his successor to play with. That's the kind of success the Bush administration can hide behind.

Because one good surge precipitates another, the president also announced a "quiet surge" to pacify Afghanistan—an additional 4,500 American targets. Barack Obama saw Bush's bet and raised him. "It is not enough troops, and not enough resources, with not enough urgency," the reputedly antiwar candidate wailed.

The surge gambit, which reduces violence by delaying it, also reduced the chance of a real withdrawal by delaying the acceptance of limits on American ambition. The strategy has not won over the Iraqis, and will prove just as ineffective on the Afghans. It's only worked at home, to reduce and silence opposition.

[WORLD]

WAITER, THERE'S A DEMOCRACY IN MY SOUP

If global democracy is on the march, it's taking some strange steps. Consider recent events in Thailand, which has one of the largest economies in Southeast Asia and a rapidly expanding middle class: perfect conditions, it would seem, for the triumph of Western-style governance. This month, however, an army of protestors, mostly middle-class and royalist, took to the streets of Bangkok to bring down their popularly elected prime minister, Samak Sundaravej. They occupied government buildings and eventually forced Samak to resign—although the official, deliciously trumped-up reason was that he took money for hosting a TV cooking show.

Samak's opponents call themselves the People's Alliance for Democracy, yet their aims are distinctly undemocratic. Their main complaint is that because Thailand remains a largely rural society, politicians who appeal to

the peasantry with promises of cheap healthcare and easy credit inevitably win elections, which in turn causes executive inefficiency and corruption. PAD wants a system in which Thailand's parliament is 70 percent nominated rather than elected. It seems that white-collar Thais, like their counterparts in Russia and China, are more concerned with strong, effective leadership than abstract concepts of freedom and universal suffrage. Perhaps we are seeing the future in the East, and it's disproportional representation.

[ALLIES]

PEACEFUL RESOLUTION

John Mearsheimer, co-author of *The Israel Lobby*, won an important victory last week. Debating at the Yale Political Union in favor of the proposition that "The United States should end its special relationship with Israel," he won by a decisive 44-25 vote.

When Mearsheimer and Steven Walt published their work last year, they faced a shrill and often dishonest campaign of vituperation in much of the mainstream media, and both authors—respected political scientists at the University of Chicago and Harvard—found themselves shut out of mainstream foreign-policy forums and publications.

They survived, their book became a bestseller, and its central thesis is increasingly accepted as arguably true. The proposition that prevailed at Yale is as measured as the book: the U.S. should simply treat Israel normally—stop touting it as a uniquely virtuous country, subsidizing its occupation of Palestinian land, and pretending its interests are identical to our own.

Hats off to the Yale Political Union for holding the debate and kudos to John Mearsheimer for carrying the day. How wonderful it would be if there were as much free speech on this subject in the United States Congress. ■

The American Conservative

Publisher

Ron Unz

Editor

Scott McConnell

Executive Editor

Kara Hopkins

Associate Editors

Michael Brendan Dougherty

Daniel McCarthy

Literary Editor

Freddy Gray

Film Critic

Steve Sailer

Contributing Editors

W. James Antle III, Andrew J. Bacevich, Doug Bandow, James Bovard, Michael C. Besch, Philip Giraldi, Paul Gottfried, Leon Hadar, Peter Hitchens, Daniel Larison, Christopher Layne, Eric S. Margolis, James P. Pinkerton, Justin Raimondo, Fred Reed, R.J. Stove, Thomas E. Woods Jr.

Art Director

Mark Graef

Associate Publisher

Jon Basil Utley

Publishing Consultant

Ronald E. Burr

Office Manager

Róisín Smyth

Founding Editors

Patrick J. Buchanan, Taki Theodoracopulos

The American Conservative, Vol. 7, No. 18, September 22, 2008 (ISSN 1540-966X). Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. TAC is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA, 22209. Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. Printed in the United States of America. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$89.97 other foreign, via airmail. Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds).

For subscription orders, payments, and other subscription inquiries—

By phone: **800-579-6148**

(outside the U.S./Canada 856-380-4131)

Via Web: www.amconmag.com

By mail: *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030

When ordering a subscription please allow 4–6 weeks for delivery of your first issue.

Inquiries and letters to the editor should be sent to letters@amconmag.com. For advertising sales or editorial call 703-875-7600.

This issue went to press on September 11, 2008. Copyright 2008 *The American Conservative*.

What Russia Wants

Moscow is not bent on world domination, just regional influence.

By Ted Galen Carpenter

RUSSIA'S MILITARY intervention in Georgia has provoked a storm of negative reactions in the United States and Europe. To most Americans—and apparently to spluttering Bush administration officials—Moscow's actions came as an unpleasant surprise. Pundits and policy experts immediately began to speculate about the Kremlin's motives in Georgia and beyond.

To Russophobes the answer is clear: the evil empire has been reborn and is on the march. They issued shrill warnings that Moscow's dust-up with Georgia was just like the Soviet Union's invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Some even invoked the threadbare 1930s analogy, with Russia playing the role of Nazi Germany. According to that logic, Moscow's actions had little to do with the obscure territorial disputes between Georgia and its secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Rather, Russia cannot abide the proliferation of democratic, pro-Western governments in neighboring countries. If the United States and its NATO allies do not repel Moscow's aggression in Georgia, hawks warn, Ukraine and the Baltic Republics will be the next targets.

The argument that Russia is a malignantly expansionist power is now common fare across the political spectrum. The perspective of the *Washington Post* and such Democratic luminaries as Madeleine Albright and Zbigniew Brzezinski is not substantially different from the views of neoconservatives such as William Kristol and Robert

Kagan—or GOP presidential nominee John McCain.

Contrary to such alarmism, it is more likely that Russia's strategic aims are modest, largely confined to its own neighborhood, and typical for a major power. Moscow's actions also appear to be more defensive than offensive—a belated reaction to clumsy, arrogant policies that the United States and its NATO allies have pursued for more than a decade.

One key aspect of the Georgia conflict is that Russia's position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is nothing new. Those regions, with Moscow's backing, achieved political autonomy—actually, de facto independence—by defeating Georgian military forces in the months following the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Russian “peacekeepers” established a presence in both regions during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, not Vladimir Putin.

Moscow's policy appears to include ethnic, security, and economic factors. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin's relations with a newly independent Georgia were contentious. It was tempting for Russian leaders to exploit tensions between Tbilisi and ethnic groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to weaken what was fast emerging as a hostile neighboring state. It was also an easy target, since those tensions had existed for generations. Indeed, the inclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia was an arbitrary edict that the Soviet government made under Josef Stalin. (A similar decision that Moscow made

under Nikita Khrushchev added the Russian-inhabited Crimea to Ukraine—another ethnic time bomb that bears watching.) Most Abkhazians and South Ossetians have never been happy being governed by Tbilisi.

Georgia's periodic attempts to re-establish sovereignty over those regions created tensions and instability on Russia's southern flank—developments that would ignite security concerns for any country.

Russian leaders are especially nervous about the prospect of turmoil in the Caucasus in light of the smoldering conflict in their own territory of Chechnya. Moscow had warned both current Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili and his predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, not to disrupt the status quo. When Saakashvili ordered an artillery barrage on the South Ossetian capital in early August, Russian forces were ready—and probably eager—to teach Tbilisi a lesson.

Important economic considerations reinforce ethnic and security concerns. There has been speculation in the United States and Europe that Russia's coercion of Georgia is part of a plot to gain control of the oil pipeline that runs from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, going through Georgia and passing near Tbilisi. The pipeline power-grab thesis is probably too simplistic. But there is little doubt that Russia wants to gain more influence over the potentially vast oil riches of the Caspian Basin. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is a significant part of the policy mosaic. Once again, though, the motives may be as much

defensive as offensive—an effort to counter the growing Western economic presence in that region.

Russia's actions in Georgia are not much different from the typical conduct of other great powers—including the United States—in their neighborhoods. A few weeks before the onset of the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that the notion of “spheres of influence” in world affairs was obsolete. That argument was either naïve or hypocritical. Certainly, Washington's conduct in the Western Hemisphere suggests that U.S. officials have not abandoned their belief in an American sphere of influence. Since World War II, the United States has invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti. Washington orchestrated a successful coup against the government of Guatemala and tried to do the same both to Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. It is a bit much for American leaders to admonish the Russians not to molest small, hostile neighbors.

Moscow is also increasingly angry at the West's repeated disdain for Russian policy preferences—indeed, core Russian interests—in Europe. The insensitivity of the United States and its allies was already apparent in the mid-1990s, with the effort to expand NATO by adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. That move violated assurances given to the Kremlin when Mikhail Gorbachev's government agreed to the reunification of Germany and continued German membership in NATO. Secretary of State James Baker assured Russian officials that the alliance would not expand eastward from Germany.

Not content with that provocation, in 2004 the U.S. pushed through NATO's incorporation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, entities that had been part of the Soviet Union. And NATO expansion is not the only manifestation of con-

tempt for Russia's interests. So is Western policy in the Balkans, traditionally a key region for Moscow. In 1995, NATO forces intervened in Bosnia's civil war to undermine the Serbs, Russia's coreligionists and longstanding political allies. Then in 1999, the United States and its allies waged an air war against Serbia, ultimately wrenching away its province of Kosovo. They bypassed the UN Security Council to do so, thereby evading a Russian veto.

Although Russia's political leaders fumed at such treatment, they could do little except issue meaningless complaints. The country was too weak, with both its economy and military in disarray. But that situation has changed. As a leading exporter of oil and natural gas, Russia has benefited enormously from the decade-long boom in the prices of commodities. With oil at \$110 a barrel—to say nothing of the price earlier this year of \$145 a barrel—the country is in a fundamentally different bargaining

position than it was in the mid and late 1990s, when oil was mired in the \$10 to \$20 a barrel range. The Kremlin has also used some of the revenue from that boom to refurbish and modernize its military.

Today Russia is much stronger than it was in the 1990s, and Moscow has begun to push back. One indicator came earlier this year when Kremlin leaders warned that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would cross a bright red line and not be tolerated. The vehemence of Moscow's reaction was one factor that led France, Germany, and other key NATO members to oppose the U.S. lobbying effort.

RUSSIA'S ACTIONS IN GEORGIA AMOUNT TO **PAYBACK FOR THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO RESPECT EVEN THE MOST BASIC RUSSIAN INTERESTS** AND AN EMPHATIC REASSERTION OF ITS **SPHERE OF INFLUENCE**.

At least in part, Russia's actions in Georgia amount to payback for the West's refusal to respect even the most basic Russian interests and an emphatic reassertion of its sphere of influence. Moscow appears to want two things: pre-eminence in its own region and treatment by the United States and NATO as a serious power whose wishes must be respected. Using military force as it did in Georgia is a crude way to make those points, but they were made effectively. The Bush administration's vocal support for Saakashvili proved to be devoid of substance. Moscow demonstrated that it could coerce a small U.S. ally on its

border, and Washington's response was impotent. The response of NATO and the European Union reflected the same reality. For all the verbal bluster of those organizations, the Europeans, cognizant of their dependence on Russia for energy supplies (among other considerations), do not want a hostile relationship with Moscow.

The Georgia episode underscores the limits of Washington's deterrence capabilities, and it should send a warning about a dangerous defect in U.S. foreign policy. The reality is that the United States can do little to protect vulnerable client states in Russia's neighborhood—unless Washington is willing to risk a military confrontation with nuclear implications. That remains true even for clients such as the Baltic states, which are formal members of NATO.

At the same time, Russia must be careful not to overplay its hand. That possibility arose in late August when Moscow sought an endorsement from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—the association of Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics—for military intervention in Georgia and the subsequent recognition of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Much to the dismay of Russian officials, the SCO refused to give its imprimatur. Indeed, the SCO statement expressed the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of countries. That should not have come as a surprise to Moscow. Several of the Central Asian countries have their own secessionist problems and do not wish to see the Kosovo and South Ossetia precedents spread. Even more important, China vehemently opposes secessionism, given its problems with Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. The SCO summit was a test of will between Moscow and Beijing—and Russia lost.

That result illustrates the limits of Moscow's power. Russia may be capable of establishing a modest sphere of influ-

ence along its perimeter, but it does not have the strength to reconstitute the Soviet empire—much less pose an expansionist threat to the heart of Europe as the USSR did during the Cold War. American opinion leaders need to curb their alarmism. Moscow's conduct in Georgia may have been brutal, but it is not out of the norm for a great power to discipline an upstart small neighbor. There is no credible evidence that Moscow has massive expansionist impulses. And even if it did, Russia lacks the power to achieve such goals. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and it certainly

is not the equivalent of Nazi Germany. U.S. policymakers need to take a deep breath, accept that Russia has returned to the ranks of major powers, and realize that Washington can no longer ignore, much less trample on, core Russian interests. The sooner they make that course correction, the better. ■

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America.

Bloom Off the Rose

Georgian “democracy” owes more to Josef Stalin than Thomas Jefferson.

By John Laughland

IT WAS WHEN WE LIFTED UP the filthy bedcovers that we saw the full extent of the gangrene. Half the man's leg was eaten away, and he screamed in agony. The women around him wailed too. There was no heating except for a puny electric cooking ring, which glowed dimly in the half-light. There was also no hope: neither this man nor any of his fellow refugees who were housed (if that is the right word) in a derelict building somewhere in the Georgian countryside had seen a doctor for months. Their food deliveries were sporadic. He would die within a matter of weeks.

This was Georgia in 1999, the year the country joined the Council of Europe, the continent's main human-rights body. To become a member, countries have to demonstrate that they have democratic governments and the rule of law. Geor-

gia has plenty of these things on paper, but the trappings of Western progress are almost entirely absent. Ordinary Georgians live without electricity or heating for most of the day, in conditions of unimaginable poverty. Yet the country counts as pro-Western because it has been the focus for Western expansionism ever since the end of the Soviet Union, supported to the hilt by Republicans and Democrats alike.

The wretches who were dying for lack of medical treatment were Georgians who had fled the separatist region of Abkhazia during the first war fought there in 1992. Because of its geopolitical importance as a Black Sea state on Russia's border and because it is a transit country for the pipeline bringing Caspian crude to the West, Georgia had by then received countless millions in aid for these refugees and for democ-

racy-building and civil-society projects. But the aid had been stolen and the refugees were left to rot.

Welcome to the country that the West holds up as a beacon of freedom, especially after the recent conflict between the Russian and Georgian armies over the other separatist region of South Ossetia. After the First World War, the Russian empire having collapsed into civil war, the great British geopolitician and strategist Sir Halford Mackinder traveled to Georgia as British High Commissioner to Southern Russia on behalf of the foreign secretary, Lord Curzon. He forced the White Russian commander, General Denikin, to promise Georgia and its neighbors independence because the British wanted to control the Baku-Batumi railway bringing oil from the Caspian to the Black Sea. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the West reacted in exactly the same way toward the Caucasus, and for the same reasons: Mackinder's American disciples have been focused on Georgia for years as a strategic forward point against Russia and because it is the main transit country for the Western-built Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Yet Georgia is not only the country that gave the world Stalin and his most violent henchmen, notably Lavrenti Beria and Grigory Ordzhonikidze. It is a country whose current first lady proclaimed that her husband was a worthy inheritor of those brutes. In 2004, Sandra Roeloffs, the Dutch wife of pro-American president Mikheil Saakashvili, told a newspaper in her home country, "Georgia has produced strong leaders: Stalin, Beria, Gamsakhurdia [the post-Soviet leader], even Shevardnadze before he became addicted to power. They looked further than Georgia alone. My husband does the same. He fits in the tradition. This country needs a strong hand. It is extremely important

that respect for authority returns. I think my husband is the right person to frighten people."

Georgia certainly has a reputation for brutality. Following Russia's descent into anarchy under Boris Yeltsin during the 1990s, Russian mafia godfathers typically used thugs from the Caucasus for their protection rackets and as business partners. "Georgian" and "Caucasian" now have the same resonance for people in Russia as "Sicilian" used to have for Europeans and Americans—the very epitome of violent clannishness and ruthless gangsterism. Indeed, the West's cultivation of mafia states like Georgia and Kosovo recalls the alliance the Americans concluded during the Second World War with organized crime in Sicily in order to fight Mussolini. The look cultivated by most Georgian men—five o'clock shadow and a black leather jacket—does little to correct the caricature.

The country's political history in the 17 years since the collapse of the USSR has been almost exclusively violent. The Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in 1992 after a civil war with the two separatist regions. He was replaced by James Baker's old friend Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister and long-time Communist Party boss in Georgia, who returned to his native land after the collapse of the USSR to take up his old job. Shevardnadze was showered with praise by Western leaders, Left and Right alike, up until the moment when he was overthrown in the Western-orchestrated "Rose Revolution" at the end of 2003, after which he was denounced as a corrupt dictator.

More Western praise was immediately lavished on the new tough man in Tbilisi when he was confirmed in office after winning over 95 percent of the vote in the presidential election, a tally of which Saddam Hussein would have

been proud. This applause came in spite of the fact that Saakashvili obviously had a penchant for violence. On Jan. 12, 2004, shortly after the Rose Revolution but before he officially became president, Saakashvili said that he had given orders to the police to open fire on any prisoners who started disturbances. He also said, "We shall liquidate all bandits, as a class." Later that year, in August, he announced that he had given orders to his navy to shoot at all ships that violated Georgia's territorial waters, including cruise ships carrying tourists to Abkhazia. (The Black Sea is a popular holiday destination for Russians.)

As soon as he seized power, Saakashvili's regime unleashed an orgy of arrests of officials. In the name of that old Communist chestnut, an "anti-corruption campaign," hundreds were rounded up. For months, Georgians were treated daily to live broadcasts of ministers, officials, and judges being bundled into police cars in the middle of the night. No doubt some Georgians relished the sight of the mighty falling, but many probably feared that one day they might get the 3 a.m. knock on the door themselves.

This was all lapped up by Saakashvili's cheerleaders in the Western media. The Georgian president has indeed achieved extraordinary success in presenting his fiefdom as a Jeffersonian paradise. This is partly due to Georgia's use of operatives in Washington, such as John McCain's foreign-policy adviser Randy Scheunemann, and a PR firm in Brussels. But more importantly, it is the result of a virulent form of Western self-delusion. Faced with seemingly intractable domestic problems, in which different political actors have to be balanced, Western states like to indulge in occasional but dangerous flights of foreign-policy escapism. We imagine that we can free subject peoples with our bombs. The image of a victim nation has now become an easy psychological trigger that can be applied

indiscriminately to Bosnian Muslims, Iraqis, and now Georgians. These unknown peoples and nations are but a blank screen on which we project our fantasies. Our image of them says much more about us than it does about reality.

One prominent BBC reporter, for example, lauded the Georgian officials in leather jackets as “the most photogenic government in the world” and gasped at the dynamism of the new chief prosecutor, Irakli Okruashvili, and at the way ordinary citizens were invited to register denunciations on the “corruption hotline.” This was true “people power” in action, he enthused—evidently unaware of the Stalinist resonance of what he was describing.

HEAVILY ARMED POLICE WERE DEPLOYED TO **CRUSH THE REVOLT**, AND THE **DEMONSTRATORS WERE SEVERELY BEATEN**. EVEN THOUGH TV SHOTS OF THIS WERE BROADCAST ON CNN, **SAAKASHVILI CONTINUED TO BE LAUDED AS A DEMOCRAT**.

Silence, not enthusiasm, was the reaction, however, when the wheel of fortune turned three years later and Okruashvili fell out with Saakashvili and started up his own opposition party. On Sept. 25, 2007, Okruashvili told a press conference, “The style of Saakashvili’s governance, which has gone beyond the limits, has made dishonesty, injustice and oppression a way of life. Everyday repression, demolition of houses and churches, robbery, ‘kulakization,’ and murders, I would stress, murders, have become common practice for the authorities.”

Okruashvili specifically alleged that Saakashvili had told him to get rid of Badri Patarkatsishvili, a Georgian-Jewish millionaire tycoon living in England, “the way it happened to Rafik Hariri.” Patarkatsishvili was a media baron who initially supported Saakashvili’s regime—notably through his TV

channel, which he ran in joint venture with Rupert Murdoch—but who later became disillusioned following the death in suspicious circumstances of the prime minister, Zurab Zhvania in 2005. Okruashvili also suggested that Zhvania had been the victim of a politically motivated murder.

The government’s response to Okruashvili’s press conference and bid for political power was to throw him into the central prison in Tbilisi. By Oct. 8, he had recanted. A videotape of his interrogation was broadcast on TV. Okruashvili, visibly distressed and sinking into long pauses, accused himself of the crimes of extortion and racketeering that had been used to arrest him, exactly

as the defendants at the Moscow show trials in the 1930s did. He denied each of the original accusations he had made on Sept. 25 and claimed that he had made them purely for personal political gain. He had evidently been tortured.

It did not take long for the political situation in the country to spiral out of control. Okruashvili’s arrest caused large demonstrations against the Saakashvili government in early November. Vast numbers of heavily armed police were deployed to crush the revolt, and the demonstrators were severely beaten. Even though TV shots of this were broadcast on CNN, Saakashvili continued to be lauded as a democrat. The regime proclaimed a state of emergency, the government was reshuffled, and new presidential and parliamentary elections were held in January and May, in the latter case on the basis of a hastily rejiggered electoral

law. Even the normally supine Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose support for Georgian brutality since 1992 has been wicked, had to admit that both campaigns were marred by widespread intimidation, violence, and ballot-stuffing. Saakashvili was re-elected by 53.5 percent, just enough to ensure that there was no second round. And Badri Patarkatsishvili did indeed die of sudden heart failure on Feb. 12, aged 52, as Okruashvili had predicted, after leaving a meeting with a prominent Russian oligarch living in London and his lawyer, Tony Blair’s former attorney general. (The police initially treated his death as suspicious, but in the end no prosecutions were brought.)

It was against this background of rising political instability and plummeting political fortunes that Mikheil Saakashvili launched his midnight onslaught on South Ossetia on Aug. 7. He evidently thought, like the Argentine generals who invaded the Falkland Islands in 1983, that a short war of national liberation would boost his flagging support. He miscalculated. Dick Cheney may have flown to Tbilisi to promise again that Georgia will soon join NATO in spite of the defeat and to commit forces to restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity, but Cheney will be out of a job by next January and so his promises are not worth much. And judging by the swiftness with which political justice is executed in Georgia, Saakashvili—who has probably now caused Georgia to lose her two secessionist regions forever—may soon follow him into early retirement, or worse. ■

John Laughland is director of studies at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris. His latest book is A History of Political Trials From Charles I to Saddam Hussein.

Free World Colossus

In the new Cold War, the U.S. is the revolutionary force.

By Lee Congdon

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S angry reaction to Russia's intervention in South Ossetia was of a piece with its harsh criticism of Vladimir Putin, the popular leader who has brought a measure of order and stability to a country that endured 74 years of communist misrule. The president and his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, are clearly offended by Putin's scarcely disguised view that democracy in Russia cannot mean what it has come to mean in the United States and Europe. It disturbs them that he exercises a personal authority greater than that which is his by virtue of his offices—that he bears, as a political figure, some resemblance to Charles de Gaulle, never a hero to democrats.

One should note that it was precisely the semi-authoritarianism of the Putin government that enlisted the support of the late Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. "It is not authoritarianism itself that is intolerable," the courageous Russian wrote in his 1973 *Letter to the Soviet Leaders*, "but the ideological lies that are daily foisted upon us." Not authoritarianism, then, but ideological tyranny was the enemy.

Americans, of course, also spurned communist ideology and feared that it might succeed in dominating the world, including the United States. They seemed not to notice that they themselves were in thrall to a political religion; recently, in fact, Yale professor David Gelernter described "Americanism"—that is, American democracy—as the fourth great Western religion. No doubt he cheered when President Bush, in his second inaugural address, declared it to be "the policy of the United States

to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." In practice, this imperial ambition, for that is what it is, has meant constant meddling in the affairs of governments the U.S. considers to be insufficiently democratic.

There is no doubt, for example, that the National Endowment for Democracy played a significant role in Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004-05. In 1999, the NED initiated the World Movement for Democracy, "which presupposes the universality of the democratic idea" and the inevitability of "democratic transition," even in a Middle East that lacks democratic traditions. One of the least convincing reasons for waging war on Iraq was to plant the seeds of democracy, with the expectation that they would germinate and grow throughout the region.

Such visions should come as no surprise. America has always prided itself on being the world's last best hope, a shining city upon a hill. But Woodrow Wilson's call for a world made safe for democracy focused and intensified that missionary zeal. Most Americans believe democracy to be the only legitimate form of government and the U.S., as the leading democratic nation, to be duty bound to evangelize the world. American officials are quick to lecture leaders of sovereign states who violate one or another of democracy's commandments, and few of them question their right to impose our system, by military force if necessary, upon those who resist conversion. They

would be puzzled by the question once posed by Edmund Burke: "Is it then a truth so universally acknowledged that a pure democracy is the only tolerable form into which human society can be thrown, that a man is not permitted to hesitate about its merits, without the suspicion of being a friend to tyranny, that is, of being a foe to mankind?"

It is a truth acknowledged by neoconservatives, many of whom have the president's ear. Irving Kristol, the godfather of neoconservatism, has written that "large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal." (The word "internal" here is particularly revealing of an interventionist mentality.) That being so, "democratic" Georgia must, at all costs, be defended against "autocratic" Russia.

It is not without interest that Kristol is an ex-Trotskyite. Like him, most of his followers have a leftist past, and that accounts for the fact that they are attracted to ideological movements. If communism did not save the world, perhaps democracy will. One can see something of the same instinct in the ex-communists who gathered around the old *National Review*. Frank Meyer was a former member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Max Eastman translated several works by Trotsky. James Burnham, another ex-Trotskyite, argued

that a new “managerial class” would replace the old capitalist class; different class, but the same structure of analysis.

There is something to Burnham’s argument, but it testifies to a cast of mind, one that predisposed him to a crusading internationalism. In a book-length pamphlet of 1953, he called for the “liberation” of Eastern Europe and dismissed mere “containment” of the Soviet Union as a sign of weakness. For him, as for so many ex-communists, anticommunism had replaced communism as a motivating ideology. One cannot help but sense that, without quite saying so, he, like many at *National Review*, including the late William F. Buckley Jr., wanted the West to wage hot war against Russia.

Leftists differ with neoconservatives on a number of important matters, particularly relating to culture, but they share the neoconservative enthusiasm for democratic revolution around the world. Why, one wonders, is this so? The answer, again, can be found in their predilection for ideology. Even before the Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe satellites collapsed, leftists had begun to distance themselves from real existing socialism, yet they were less embarrassed by the record of communist regimes in power than by their manifest failure.

Communism having been exposed as unfit by its inability to survive, leftists went in search of another ideology and soon hit upon democracy. For them, however, “democracy” does not simply mean universal suffrage and equal opportunity; they have redefined it to refer to political-social radicalism in general. To spread democracy, then, means to promote feminism, multiculturalism, homosexual rights, environmentalism—and socialism.

In the postwar era, those who raised their voices in opposition to America’s ideological foreign policy have been political realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lipp-

mann, Henry Kissinger, and, above all, George Kennan. Burnham’s attack on the policy of containment was aimed directly at Kennan, its architect but also a probing critic of the manner in which Americans conducted foreign policy. Kennan was able to draw upon his vast experience as a Russian-speaking expert and diplomat in the USSR and, unlike so many of his generation, he was never tempted by communist, or any other, ideology, most of which espoused an egalitarianism that was foreign to his nature. “I am,” he told one interviewer, “very much opposed to egalitarian tendencies of all sorts in governmental life and in other walks of life.”

Naturally, then, Kennan never believed that the export of democracy was a semi-religious imperative. Forms of government and society, he knew, grow out of the historical experience of a people, and historical experiences differ greatly. “Our national experience,” he insisted “was never shared by any country and will never be shared by any country in the future.” We ought not to be surprised, therefore, to find that other peoples resent being told how they must order their public and private lives.

In general, Kennan, in the tradition of Plato and Tocqueville, preferred authoritarian, nonideological systems of rule. As a result of having observed Kurt Schuschnigg’s government in 1930s Austria, he concluded that while ideological tyranny was responsible for more evil than democracy, benevolent authoritarianism offered greater possibilities for good. He admired the semi-authoritarian system presided over by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck not only because of the realism with which the Iron Chancellor conducted foreign policy but because of his antipathy to mass political enthusiasms.

Such enthusiasms make it difficult to conduct a foreign policy based upon the national interest. The American people

like to think that their government is pursuing moral goals, that it is striving to create a better world. Thus foreign policy makers defend their decisions in moral terms. Those like Kennan, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau, who defended the national interest, believe that those entrusted with the conduct of foreign policy must take the world as it is, not as they would like it to be. They must recognize realities of power and not be led astray by a legalistic-moralistic approach to world affairs. According to Kennan, such an approach, “rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older motives of national interest. A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early end short of some form of total domination.”

The legalistic-moralistic approach, with its lack of restraint, is precisely what America’s foreign-policy establishment has adopted. The United States’ determination to foment democratic revolution in every region of the world can only mean interventions without end and, inevitably, conflict with states unimpressed by democratic dogma. It has seriously damaged relations with Russia, which remains a proud, nuclear-armed power—and one now mercifully free of ideology. Had Georgia been a member of NATO, as the Bush administration insists it must, we would now, as Pat Buchanan has put it, “be eyeball to eyeball with Russia, facing war in the Caucasus” over a matter that does no harm to our interests. We ought by now to have learned the lesson of 1914—that nations can awake to find themselves in unnecessary wars that threaten the very foundations of civilized life. ■

Lee Congdon is the author, most recently, of George Kennan: A Writing Life.

Washington's War Guarantee

A YEAR AFTER taking power, in June 1934, Adolf Hitler made his first visit abroad—to his idol Benito Mussolini in Venice. Babbling on incessantly about *Mein Kampf* and the Negroid strain in Mediterranean peoples, the Führer made a dismal impression.

"What a clown this Hitler is," Mussolini told an aide.

Two weeks later, Hitler executed the Röhm purge and murdered scores of old stormtrooper comrades. In late July, Austrian Nazis, attempting a coup, assassinated Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, a friend of Mussolini whose wife and child were then his guests.

Il Duce ordered four divisions to the Brenner Pass and flew to Vienna to vent his rage and disgust with Hitler. He called a summit at Stresa with Britain and France to agree on military action should Hitler make any new move in violation of Versailles.

At the time, however, Il Duce was also plotting revenge on Abyssinia for a bloody border clash with Italian Somaliland. Mussolini thought his allies would understand if he invaded the Ogaden to add an African colony to his new Roman Empire, just as the British and French had so often done in previous decades.

Mussolini miscalculated. Morally outraged, Britain and France went before the League of Nations and had sanctions imposed on Italy that were too weak to defeat her but punitive enough to insult her. Friendless, isolated, and condemned as an aggressor by Europe, Italy and Mussolini had nowhere to turn but Hitler's Germany.

Thus, over the fate of an Abyssinian slave empire, Britain drove her faithful World War I ally into the arms of a Nazi dictator Mussolini loathed and had

wished to confront beside Britain. And Abyssinia was overrun.

Are we making the same mistake in the Caucasus?

Mikheil Saakashvili started this war with his barrage attack and occupation of South Ossetia. Russia's war of retribution was far less violent or excessive than the U.S. bombing of Serbia for 78 days over Kosovo or our unprovoked war on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which has brought death to scores of thousands, or Israel's 35 days of bombing of Lebanon for a border skirmish with Hezbollah.

Yet John McCain declared of Russia, "In the 21st century, nations don't invade other nations." Even Dick Cheney must have guffawed.

Russia must get out now, adds Bush, for South Ossetia and Abkhazia belong to a sovereign Georgia. But when did Bush demand that Israel get off the Golan Heights or withdraw from Bethlehem, which Israelis have occupied for 41 years, as he demands that Russia get out of the birthplace of Josef Stalin, which Russia has occupied for two weeks? As Israel was provoked in 1967, so, too, was Russia provoked.

Russians died in Saakashvili's attack, as Americans died in Pancho Villa's raid on New Mexico in 1916. We sent "Black Jack" Pershing, future general George Patton, and a U.S. army 300 miles into Mexico to kill Villa. Was this proportionate?

If we proceed on a course of isolating Russia from the West, keeping her out of the World Trade Organization, throwing her out of the G-8, and ending co-operation with NATO, where do we think Russia will go? Where did Il Duce go, when he was excommunicated from the West?

Condi Rice compares Vladimir Putin's action in Georgia to Leonid Brezhnev's crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. She raced to Warsaw to ink a deal to put 10 antimissile missiles and U.S. Patriot missiles manned by Americans into Poland.

Does the Stanford provost have any idea where the end of this road lies, upon which she and Bush have started the United States?

What do we do if Russia responds to our Patriots in Poland with the Russian S-300 antiaircraft system in Iran and Syria?

If the United States intends to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and arm them to fight Russia, why should Russia not dissolve the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and move her tank armies into Belarus and up to the borders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania?

Would we send U.S. troops into the Baltic Republics to signal that we will fight Russia to honor our NATO war guarantees? Which NATO allies would fight alongside us against a nuclear-armed Russia?

If we bring Ukraine into NATO, what do we do if Russified eastern Ukraine secedes and Russia sends troops to back the rebels? Do we send warships into Russia's bathtub, the Black Sea, and commit to fight as long as it takes to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity?

In March 1939, Britain pledged to declare war and fight Germany to the death to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Poland. How did that one turn out for Britain and Poland?

Before we start down the road of isolating and encircling Russia with weak NATO allies, let us think through General Petraeus's question in 2003 about Iraq: "Tell me, how does this thing end?"

But then, these folks never seem to think anything through. ■

Maternal Flame

Sarah Palin's family-friendly appeal.

By Steve Sailer

WHY, IN ONE UPROARIOUS week of American politicking that not even H.L. Mencken would have expected, has the obscure governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin, outraged roughly one half of the country and overjoyed the other?

What intrigues people about elections aren't the platform planks. Deep down, political contests are about picking symbolic champions. Just as Barack Obama, recently of the Illinois legislature, has excited tens of millions by his emphasis on his bloodlines, by his implication that national racial reconciliation is "in my DNA," the overstuffed life story of the caribou huntress and mother of five (and soon to be grandmother at age 44) embodies the oldest boast Americans have made about their homeland: the fecundity of the frontier.

Compared to Obama's much-lauded but tedious life, cautiously plotted in countless Chicago backrooms, the Alaskan-sized lustiness of Governor Palin's full-throttle biography—the only-in-Alaska factoids about her keep piling up like an Old West tall tale—always leaves me laughing.

Consider, for example, Palin's husband Todd. What kind of man could be married to a woman so hormonally exuberant, with her dual archetypes straight out of a Camille Paglia reverie: half Alaskan Amazon, half Venus of Willendorf? Exactly the kind you'd expect: he works as both a North Slope oilfield roughneck and a salmon fisherman. He's also won the state's snowmobile championship, the 2,000-mile Tesoro Iron Dog race, four times. He only finished fourth this year because he had to ride the last 400 miles

with a broken arm after being thrown 70 feet. Did I mention he's part Eskimo?

Mrs. Palin's instant ascent to frontier folk hero explains some of the unhinged hatred felt by Obama supporters. They'd been fantasizing about their genetically nuanced man of the future, their political Tiger Woods, when they were blindsided by a figure out of America's buried past, a merrily comic Wild West character in the tradition of Annie Oakley and Calamity Jane. She's already inspired hundreds of one-liners in the Chuck Norris mode—"As head of Alaska's National Guard, Sarah Palin taught troops how to scare a grenade into not exploding"—the modern equivalent of all the yarns about Davy Crockett.

The even more fundamental reason underlying all the fury on one side and amusement on the other is that this brouhaha centers around female fertility.

In more than a few liberals, she sets off the same creepy stalker behavior that Michelle Malkin has endured for years. Palin has the accent of Francis McDormand's classic character Marge Gunderson, the heavily pregnant lady sheriff who shoots the bad guy in "Fargo," but, as Obama has discovered, Palin has an old point guard's sharp elbows. The little-studied but no doubt sizable Nerd Bloc is excited by pictures of an attractive woman shooting big guns, just like in their favorite Angelina Jolie movies.

Human beings can't help feeling strongly about making babies. Look at the celebrity gossip columns. The who-is-sleeping-with-whom stuff can't compete with the pregnancy news. Stars now auction off exclusive rights to the first photos of their offspring, even

though all newborns look alike. Pictures of the new twins from the most celebrated breeding stock—Jolie and Brad Pitt—went for a reported \$14 million.

An obsession in politics with breeding is both very old (hereditary monarchy) and very contemporary. The main qualifications of the current president and this year's Democratic runner-up are that they are, respectively, the scion and consort of ex-presidents. More subtly, Obama launched himself at the 2004 Democratic convention by devoting the first 380 words of his famous speech to detailing the two stocks from which he was crossbred. He implied that, like the heir to a dynastic merger of yore—think King Henry VIII, offspring of a Lancaster-York marriage that ended the War of the Roses—he is the one we've been waiting for to end the War of the Races. (Obama left out the part about his mom being 17 when his polygamist father, who already had a family, got her pregnant.)

To the outrage of Obamaphiles, Palin has horned in on all that subliminal symbolism with her own old-fashioned American brand. She's had five kids while throwing out the crooks and nepotists. And now she has a 17-year-old pregnant daughter engaged to a strapping 18-year-old hockey player in one of the few places left in America where a young man with a strong back can support a family.

Thus, Blue State whites are alarmed and enraged to be reminded that Red State whites can afford to outbreed them.

Frontier fecundity is hardly a new concept. In 1751, Ben Franklin pointed out that America's low population density meant higher wages and lower land prices, which in turn allowed earlier marriages and more children.

In this century, the fundamental engine painting low-density areas red and high-density areas blue is what I call Affordable Family Formation. Where wages are high compared to home prices, people can afford to marry earlier and have

more children. For instance, Todd Palin, who is not a college graduate, earned \$93,000 last year between fishing and oil-field work. (He would have made even more, but to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest for his wife in her dealings with oil companies, he stepped down from a management position to a unionized rank-and-file job.) According to ACCRA cost-of-living data on BestPlaces.net, the standard of living you can enjoy in red Wasilla, Alaska for \$93,000 would cost you \$159,000 in blue San Francisco. Due to its remoteness and frigidity, Alaska isn't a cheap place to live, but housing costs in exurban Wasilla are only 35 percent of what they are in San Francisco. Moreover, Alaska's distance

from the Mexican border means that blue-collar wages are high.

Not surprisingly, Alaska is second only to Mormon Utah in total fertility among non-Hispanic white women, with 2.28 babies per lifetime, 38 percent higher than in crowded California.

This Baby Gap helps paint the electoral map red or blue. In 2004, Bush carried 25 of the top 26 states in the total fertility rate (expected number of babies per woman per lifetime) among whites, while Kerry was victorious in the bottom 16. It's all about the ratio of land and resources to people. Even excluding Alaska, the counties that Bush carried in 2004 are four times as large in area as Kerry's counties.


The policy implication of this was clear

to Ben Franklin a quarter of a millennium ago: restricting immigration benefits Americans. The political implications of the Baby Gap should be equally clear to Republican leaders today, but there's little evidence that John McAmnesty has noticed.

In Palin's case, having this much of a life might be too much for a president. (Margaret Thatcher once told my wife that she was glad she had twins so she could get having babies over and done with and get back to work.) Still, John McCain, who lost five planes yet survived and who picked up the GOP nomination by the random chance of winning in winner-take-all states, may have stumbled into another piece of luck. ■

"Must reading. The writing is at Ralph de Toledano's best, better than which no one gets. It focuses on the historical and the contemporary, casting a sharp light on the players and the events of our deeply troubled times."
—WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

"de Toledano's most ambitious work. . . . connects the dots and timeline of the planned decline of Western Civilization. Those dots lead ultimately to the Institute of Social Research... The 'Frankfurt School.'"
—Wes Vernon, renewamerica.com



CRY HAVOC

The Great American Bring-down and How It Happened!

By Ralph de Toledano

The last published work of the late, great Conservative writer and historian.



Order today! Send check or money order for
\$22.00 (includes shipping and handling) to

Anthem Books

PO Box 20163 Washington, D.C. 20041

Or order online from
www.amazon.com
For more information, contact
mailto:anthemeditions@yahoo.com

"For the last five decades, de Toledano writes, war has been declared on America and its most important educational, cultural, and economic institutions. "Perversity is increasingly a way of life," he charges. "What was once obscenity is the ordinary currency. The current obscenity is God, morality, the family. Rape and murder fill the newspapers. . . . The Bill of Rights is a scrap of paper, attached to a decaying and ignored Constitution. Education is a medium for dissolution, abolishing learning. The media is steeped in prevarication and nihilism."

—Human Events

Connerly Cashes In

The anti-preferences activist gets rich off of affirmative action.

By Michael Brendan Dougherty

THIS WAS SUPPOSED to be a banner year for Ward Connerly, the former University of California regent and the Right's most visible anti-affirmative-action activist. His 2000 biography, *Creating Equal: My Fight Against Racial Preferences*, was re-released in February. His latest book, *Lessons From My Uncle James*, was set to hit shelves this summer. More significantly, he was to be the driving force behind a series of ballot initiatives that would have forbidden state governments from "grant[ing] preferential treatment to any group or individual on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in areas of public contracting, public education, or public employment." He marketed this effort as Super Tuesday for Equal Rights.

George Will gave his imprimatur to Connerly and his mission in a *Washington Post* column: "Will the superstitions surrounding race ever fade away? Not before governance is cleansed of the sort of race-based policies opposed by Connerly, who intimately knows the increasing absurdity of racial classifications and the folly of government preferences based on them."

But Connerly's plans are unraveling. His biography is absent from most stores and barely registered in conservative book clubs. His second book is mysteriously delayed. His ballot ambitions were scaled back, first from 10 states to five. Then legal challenges and organized opposition winnowed the tally down to just two.

This is unfortunate because anti-affirmative-action ballot measures usually pass when put to a vote. Connerly would

know. He and the nonprofit organizations he founded helped three such measures pass—in California in 1996, Washington in 1998, and Michigan in 2006.

But don't spend too much sympathy on Ward Connerly. The Right's point man on affirmative action doesn't need political successes to be a success. While his plans sputter and his former achievements are overturned, Connerly is still being handsomely rewarded. Once he received favored status from the conservative movement, his future was guaranteed. As an activist, Connerly has made millions opposing affirmative action. As a businessman and consultant, he has also made hundreds of thousands in large part because of it.

Between 1999 and 2005, Connerly's nonprofits, the American Civil Rights Institute and the American Civil Rights Coalition, didn't challenge a single affirmative-action law. Yet donations climbed to almost \$2 million per year. The share that Connerly paid to himself, or to his private for-profit consulting firm, Connerly and Associates, also dramatically increased. In 1998, 22 percent of his nonprofits' revenue was paid to Connerly in salary or to his firm. By 2001, Connerly's salary and the fees charged by Connerly and Associates ate up 49 percent of the nonprofits' combined revenue. Most of the money paid to the firm was listed on tax forms as "speaking fees." In 2006, when Connerly took up a concrete goal in political activism—ending Michigan's affirmative-action policies—the cut of nonprofit revenue paid to him and his firm rose to 66 percent of total receipts, nearly \$1.6 million.

Connerly's nonprofits employ him for 30 hours a week and two others full time. The nonprofits then hire him from Connerly and Associates to make speeches. In 2003, ACRI and ACRC paid him \$314,079 while he managed two people. By comparison, that year the National Action Network, which receives about \$1 million in public funds, only paid Al Sharpton about \$4,000. The Claremont Institute, a neoconservative think tank in California, paid its top executive \$132,000, and its staff is 9 times the size of Connerly's. The Heritage Foundation paid its president \$292,000 to manage a staff of over 180. The primary financial responsibility that Ward Connerly had at his nonprofits that year was paying his firm over \$400,000 for Ward Connerly the consultant, Ward Connerly the speaker, Ward Connerly the political maven—and occasionally a security detail to guard him.

Is this illegal? The IRS makes clear in its statute that nonprofit organizations cannot be used to enrich one individual or company, but few of these cases are prosecuted. In 2006, during the heat of Connerly's Michigan push, Congressmen John Conyers and Charles Rangel asked the IRS to look into his dealings. An IRS spokesman said that he could not comment on a case under investigation. Connerly defended himself by saying that he avoids any trickery on his IRS forms and dutifully pays taxes on all the money he receives.

Not long after the *Sacramento Bee* and the House members began inquiring about his compensation, Connerly changed procedures at his nonprofits.

They now have a board that reviews his salary. He says, "It's based on a formula that is devised by our auditors and accountants—a base salary of \$300,000 and then compensation for speeches and things." Connerly no longer has his private company invoice his nonprofits: "I pay Connerly and Associates for those services out of funds I receive for ACRI, so they [Connerly and Associates] in fact became a sub-contractor to me." If this explanation seems convoluted, that's fine by Connerly.

Whose money is he using? It's difficult to say. During Connerly's push for Proposition 54, which would have banned California from collecting racial data on its employees or students, ACRC was sued by political opponents for breaking campaign-finance laws. The settlement revealed that Connerly's donors included a handful of deep-pocketed conservatives, including grocery magnate John Uhlmann and media mogul Rupert Murdoch.

Connerly was an odd candidate to become a favorite son of the conservative movement. Born in the ethnic melting pot of Louisiana at the start of World War II, he describes his ancestry as one-quarter black mixed with Irish, French, and Choctaw. His father left the family when Connerly was two, and his mother died when he was four. He was young enough to have experienced Jim Crow laws. After graduating with honors in political science from Sacramento State College, Connerly embarked on a low-level career in California politics, working in the Department of Housing and Urban Development and serving on various assembly committees. It was during this time that he befriended Pete Wilson, a legislator who later became governor.

In 1973, using the experience and connections he gained in California state politics, Connerly opened Connerly and Associates with his wife Ilene. His work

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently learned he was being spied upon by Washington,

thanks Bob Woodward's latest book *The War Within*. One intelligence source reportedly related, "We know everything he says." If the Iraqis are now tearing holes in their walls to find the microphones, they might be disappointed. The latest surveillance technologies are variations on systems pioneered by the Russians in the 1980s and used with some success against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. They use a transmitter that saturates a target space with subsonic noise. The noise is then picked up by a receiver on the other side of the target and the "holes" in the sound pattern are reconstructed to recreate the conversations taking place in the room. The technology can be defeated using secure rooms or "bubbles," but it is to be presumed that most Iraqi government meetings do not incorporate any special security measures.



Could the October Surprise happen again?

There is considerable buzz among former intelligence officers that an overseas crisis is being engineered or allowed to explode. The spinning of the Georgia incident to create a faux conflict with Russia is a harbinger of things to come. As one officer puts it, how else might one plausibly explain so many otherwise manageable international situations being allowed to turn confrontational so close to the election? The deliberately provocative build-up of naval forces in the Persian Gulf and Black Sea; reports in the European media that an attack on Iran is imminent; the visit of Dick Cheney to Georgia and Ukraine; massive aid to rearm Tbilisi; and the launching of the first U.S. ground forces attacks inside Pakistan—all of this could have been deferred until after the election. The potential for a serious international crisis during the next 60 days has increased dramatically. And John McCain is clearly reading the tea leaves, not hesitating to stir the pot with increasingly harsh rhetoric targeting Russia. There is growing belief among intelligence officers that an incident will either be manufactured or allowed to occur to strengthen the electoral prospects of the Republicans' "national security" candidate. Few believe that the ethically challenged Bush administration would hesitate to engineer its own Gulf of Tonkin to guarantee a GOP victory.

The original October Surprise started with a rogue operation by the CIA chiefs of station in Madrid, Paris, and Rome, all classmates in the Operations Directorate who had come up together in Africa and the Middle East. In the summer of 1980, they arranged a series of secret meetings between Reagan's campaign manager, Bill Casey, and Iranian representatives that led to an Iranian agreement not to release the American hostages they were holding, guaranteeing electoral defeat for the hapless Jimmy Carter. But no one believes that a 2008 surprise would again involve the CIA, which has been purged and brought to heel to such an extent that any independent action is unimaginable. Look instead to the still well-entrenched neocons operating out of the office of Vice President Cheney. Their hopes for the future ride on a McCain victory.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance.

earned him a spot in the California Building Industry Hall of Fame, and he became well known among California's business and political elite. Soon everyone would know him.

Connerly was appointed to the University of California's Board of Regents in 1993, just as California politics took a dramatic turn. The Los Angeles riots had exposed new racial fault lines, and Republicans were taking advantage. In 1994, the California GOP achieved its first statewide majority in over three decades by supporting Proposition 187, which prohibited public services for illegal aliens. The initiative was quickly thrown out by the courts as unconstitutional. But Republicans and the media went searching for the next big thing in white backlash, which turned out to be opposition to affirmative action. Governor Wilson, a supporter of affirmative action as recently as 1994, began to champion "equality of opportunity" while eyeing the 1996 Republican presidential primaries.

If Wilson's embrace of anti-affirmative-action politics seemed poll-driven, Connerly's was also opportunistic. In the same year that Connerly discovered his opposition to affirmative action, he was very much a beneficiary of it. In 1994, his consulting firm was registered with the state as a minority- and woman-owned business. While telling media outlets that affirmative action was the equivalent of the "colored only" water fountains he encountered in Louisiana as a child, his firm was receiving a \$35,000 contract from the state of California to carry out energy conservation training. Under the same noncompetitive bidding status, his firm had secured a state contract worth \$100,000 in 1992 and another for \$1.1 million in 1989.

Despite this history, Connerly took up the anti-affirmative-action cause with vigor. In 1995, he became chairman of the California Civil Rights Initiative campaign promoting Proposition 209, which

would end state-sponsored affirmative action. The effort received generous funding from conservative donors. Murdoch, for instance, gave \$1 million to Republicans in support of Prop 209. The measure passed with 54 percent of the vote in 1996. A year later, Connerly formed his two nonprofits. He became the public face of anti-affirmative-action activism and, despite his long record as a moderate Republican with generally libertarian views on cultural questions, a fixture of the conservative movement.

His activism is not entirely cynical. Political convictions can evolve, even if the change is initially motivated by ambition. Connerly's work has exposed him to hysterical opposition from the old civil-rights establishment and every conceivable formulation of the "Uncle Tom" slur has been applied to him. He speaks movingly against racial discrimination. But even though successful political movements welcome true defectors, they don't usually crown them with wealth and fame for accomplishing nothing.

Not that this troubles the Right. David Keene, chairman of the American Conservative Union, says that Connerly "is not only well-regarded, but he's earned it." Longtime conservative activist David Horowitz, who also runs a California-based nonprofit, justifies Connerly's take by citing the opportunity costs that come with doing political work—time away from business and lost clients. Further, says Horowitz, "His donors can look up his salary, and they're obviously happy with what he's doing." Keene cautions against "a superficial reading [of IRS filings], which don't tell the whole story. ... It becomes a question of judgment on what was that work worth."

What was Connerly's Super Tuesday for Equal Rights worth? The potentially election-changing project has fallen apart. The contactors Connerly hired to obtain signatures are now battling over

fees. Meanwhile, the pro-affirmative action cause seems to be getting a better bang for its buck.

Connerly's past successes are also disappearing. Ending affirmative action in California's schools dramatically reduced minority enrollment for one year, but it didn't take long for administrators to find ways to get around Prop 209. According to statistician Richard Berk, new "comprehensive reviews" in UCLA admissions meant that between 1998 and 2001, Hispanics were still 1.8 times as likely as whites to be admitted and blacks 3.6 times as likely.

Yet Connerly's accolades continue to pile up. In 2005, he was awarded the Bradley Prize, a \$250,000 grant with no strings attached, usually given to a successful totem of the conservative movement. Writing in the *Weekly Standard* Andrew Ferguson observed, "the prize amounts to a parody of what liberals say conservatives always want to do anyway—in tax cuts, for example: boost the circumstances of people whose circumstances don't need boosting, pass lots of money to people who already have lots of money." The cofounder of Connerly's nonprofits, *National Review* president Thomas Rhodes, happens to sit on the board of the Bradley Foundation.

The political fight against affirmative action is supposed to be a battle for meritocracy, for a color-blind society rather than a color-obsessed one, for standards and accomplishment over the prerogatives of racial privilege. But with all the favor and blandishments of the conservative movement at his disposal, Ward Connerly has little to show for his efforts. He has paid himself a handsome salary to manage payments to his own firm. He receives every reward and honor conservatives can bestow, yet there is just as much affirmative action as when he started his political career.

Why is he the Right's man for the job? ■

Ron Paul's Party

WHILE TWITCHY COPS and party hacks congregated in St. Paul for the Republican Convention, 12,000 Ron Paul supporters assembled for the Rally for the Republic in Minneapolis. The counter-convention featured a dozen speakers—from libertarian luminaries Bill Kauffman and Lew Rockwell to ex-governors Jesse Ventura and Gary Johnson—plus musical acts Sara Evans and Aimee Allen (the freedom movement's answer to Avril Lavigne, with more talent and less tolerance for the Bilderberg Group). Barry Goldwater Jr. introduced Paul's keynote.

John McCain's big tent across the river brought together hawks of all persuasions, from Joe Lieberman to Sarah Palin to Rudy Giuliani. The Connecticut senator, as staunch an advocate for military adventurism as abortion, got a prime-time speaking slot. A certain pro-life, antiwar Texan was *persona non grata*.

"We offered our services. We would have been glad to have an opportunity, we would have been pleased to participate," Paul said. But "that wasn't available to us." McCain did not want his primary challenger even to be seen. "We had thought we would be able to go over, but my floor privileges have been strictly limited," Paul revealed. "They've given me a pass that is second class."

That pass required that the congressman enter and leave only by a certain door, be chaperoned by a McCain flack, and not bring any staff. Paul had no intention of attending under those conditions. Yet he didn't get mad—he got even. "We still have enough freedom in this country to get involved and become the party," he said, "and that's been our approach rather than complaining about it."

"The Republican Party ought to be welcoming me because I appeal to young people," Paul contended. Indeed,

one of the most remarkable things about Paul's presidential campaign was its ability to energize youth around the unlikeliest of causes: "One of the most exciting issues that we talk about with young people is monetary policy."

Even more than the Iraq War, the Federal Reserve stokes the passions of Paul's supporters. During his keynote, the Target Center shook to chants of "End the Fed!" Months earlier, during a Paul appearance at the University of Michigan, students burned Federal Reserve notes—money, or Uncle Sam's facsimile thereof.

Impressive as the rally was, even more portentous may have been the 600 activists who turned out for training put on by Paul's new organization, the Campaign for Liberty, in the days before. They sat through ten-and-a-half hours of political boot camp on Aug. 31 and another eight hours the next day. This was a promising start for the Campaign for Liberty, which aims to do for the small-government, antiwar side what the Christian Coalition did for religious conservatives in the early 1990s.

Yet it has tensions at the philosophical level. One activist observed that there seemed to be many "paleoconservatives" in the group's leadership, while much of the grassroots were "anarcho-capitalists." Paul recognizes the fault line. "I have many friends in the libertarian movement who look down on those of us who get involved in political activity," he acknowledged, but "eventually, if you want to bring about changes ... what you have to do is participate in political action."

The Campaign for Liberty's organizers emphasized that though there might be few candidates Paul supporters can get behind, there are always ballot issues and legislation that the grassroots

can organize to stop—tax hikes, gun registration, municipal bonds. Yet the great causes that animate the Paul coalition—war and monetary policy—are national. Paul is 73. If he doesn't run in 2012, where will his supporters go?

One man eager to take up his banner is former Minnesota governor Jesse Ventura. "I wrote the book *Don't Start the Revolution Without Me*. Well, I'm here," he announced, hinting that "in 2012 we'll give them a race they'll never forget." The former pro-wrestler was charismatic—and kooky. He teased the 9/11 "truther" contingent in the audience by asking why Osama bin Laden had not been formally charged with the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. That way lies madness. If Ventura is the future of the Paul movement, it will go the way of the Reform Party.

A better prospect for 2012 might be the rally's other ex-governor—Gary Johnson of New Mexico. He doesn't have Ventura's presence, but he's witty. Describing his opposition to mandatory-helmet laws for motorcyclists, he said, "We have an organ donor shortage. If you want to ride your motorcycle without a helmet, go ahead." Johnson is even more of a non-interventionist than his admirers had suspected. "We have a military presence in 155 countries," he said, "We need to embark on a process of getting those 155 countries unoccupied, à la Ron Paul."

The Rally for the Republic made plain that Ron Paul Republicans will have no truck with McCain or Obama. But is there any other politician they can support, besides Paul himself? More than just their movement is at stake: Paul's revolution might be the last chance in a generation for sound money and a non-imperial foreign policy. ■

Four More Years

Both parties remain in thrall to the Bush Doctrine.

By Tony Smith

FIVE YEARS AFTER the invasion of Iraq—arguably the most momentous mistake in the history of American foreign policy—what have we learned? Maybe nothing. The current administration is still mired in the mindset that brought about this calamity, and for all their attempts to distance themselves from an unpopular president, have John McCain or Barack Obama really renounced the Bush Doctrine?

Issued in a series of speeches and documents during 2002, the Bush Doctrine was the most complex and coherent of the many presidential statements of its kind. Its grand design rested on the conviction that America's military primacy conferred a right to reorganize hostile or failed states into free-market democracies. The result promised to be an enduring world order of peace in freedom under American leadership. The doctrine legitimized the invasion of Iraq, but its goal was global dominion.

This bid for world hegemony rested on three propositions. First, the world can be divided into democracies and tyrannies, with the former being repositories of virtue and the latter home to all that is evil. Second, the United States holds the key to a peaceful order applicable to virtually all peoples and places, and a conversion from tyranny to freedom is an operation the U.S. can conduct. Third, where possible to expand the world's zone of peace, the United States will act with force multilaterally to take over hostile or failed states or preemptively and unilaterally if so obliged. To win the peace that follows

the victory of arms, the U.S. is prepared to occupy foreign peoples for their own good as well as our own.

The Iraq War put those tenets to the test, and the verdict is in: we do not have the power—and may not have the interest—to sponsor democratic governments wherever they are lacking, and a modern form of progressive imperialism aimed at reconstructing post-conflict states is far more likely to turn nationalist forces against us than to rally international opinion in our favor.

The question, then, is where John McCain and Barack Obama stand. Will they extend or eliminate the Bush Doctrine?

With the Republican candidate, there is little doubt. Since 1993, McCain has been chairman of the International Republican Institute, a part of the National Endowment for Democracy. Under IRI auspices, he was intimately involved in efforts to advance democratic ideology long before Bush gave any thought to such matters. Neoconservatives like William Kristol preferred McCain in the 2000 Republican primaries for just this reason.

He has chosen as his top foreign-policy adviser Randy Scheunemann, once a board member of the neoconservative Project for the New American Century. Scheunemann also helped create the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (among whose members were Sens. Joseph Lieberman and John McCain), participated in the drafting of the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, joined the Project for Transitional Democracies, and was

briefly a consultant to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on Iraq policy.

Given his background and contacts, there should be no surprise that McCain endorses all three elements of the Bush Doctrine. He entitled his article in the November-December 2007 issue of *Foreign Affairs* "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom," writing, "The protection and promotion of the democratic ideal, at home and abroad, will be the surest source of security and peace for the century that lies before us." Accordingly, McCain would create a global League of Democracies to deal with human rights and democracy promotion worldwide through military means. In Asia, our natural allies would be market democracies, "But until China moves toward political liberalization, our relationship will be based on periodically shared interests rather than on the bedrock of shared values." Given Russian revanchism, "we need a new Western approach" to handling Moscow, including reinforcing the solidarity of NATO and expelling Russia from the G-8.

McCain's March 26 speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council displayed an especially militant commitment to the Bush Doctrine. America should organize "a global coalition for peace and freedom. ... We must help expand the power and reach of freedom, using all our many strengths as a free people." Looking at the Middle East, he declared that while Turkey, Israel, India, and Indonesia are democratic, "Iraq and Afghanistan lie at the heart of that region. And whether they eventually become stable democra-

cies themselves, or allowed to sink back into chaos and extremism, will determine not only the fate of that critical part of the world, but our fate as well.”

He has called for an expansion of the Army and Marine Corps by 150,000 troops, an increase in Special Forces, and an Army Advisory Corps of 20,000 to work with military establishments abroad. McCain has also proposed a “civilian ‘surge’” capable of tasks ranging from institutional reconstruction to anti-terrorism in post-conflict situations. Given the training of these civilians in foreign languages and culture, they might emerge as something of a Colonial Office.

In short, with McCain and his closest advisers in office, the major tenets of the Bush Doctrine would remain fully in force. But the other side of the aisle doesn’t offer the alternative many voters presume.

Barack Obama is certainly more critical than McCain of the Bush foreign policy, but he is definitely not embracing the George McGovern slogan “Come Home, America.” Speaking to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in April 2007, Obama declared that his administration would open “a new chapter in American leadership” and that our task is to “lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good. ... America’s larger purpose in the world is to promote the spread of freedom—that is the yearning of all who live in the shadow of tyranny and despair.” Accordingly, he called for increased foreign aid to address root causes of poverty and failed states as well as for the expansion of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 to have “a 21st century military to stay on the offense from Djibouti to Kandahar.”

In *Foreign Affairs* in July-August 2007, under the title “Renewing American Leadership,” Obama called for appropriating \$50 billion annually for “Building just, secure, democratic societies” for

troubled parts of the world: “We can help build accountable institutions that deliver services and opportunity: strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, honest police forces, free presses, vibrant civil societies ... freedom from want.”

Unlike McCain and Bush, he does not draw rigid distinctions between virtuous democracies and menacing tyrannies. But neither does he talk about reducing America’s role in world affairs, holding the line on the military budget, curtailing foreign aid, or avoiding the occupation of foreign countries in order to democratize them. Just the opposite. Like McCain and similarly to the Bush Doctrine, Obama appears to believe that a strong military backing the expansion of democratic government and free markets should be basic elements of American foreign policy.

LONG BEFORE **BUSH WAS CO-OPTED BY NEOCONSERVATIVES**, THE NOTION OF AMERICA AS **“THE INDISPENSABLE NATION”** WAS ANNOUNCED IN FEBRUARY 1998 BY A **DEMOCRAT**.

We should not be surprised. Not only has this kind of talk become the vernacular of American politics lest one be labeled an “isolationist,” but it aligns with powerful currents within the Democratic Party. Long before Bush was co-opted by neoconservatives, the notion of America as “the indispensable nation” was announced in February 1998 by a Democrat, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further into the future.” There’s little reason to think that Albright, reported to be on Obama’s foreign-policy advisory team, has revised her opinion.

There are two interpretations of “indispensable nation.” One points to the disproportionate role America plays on the world stage and calls for a responsible exercise of power. In matters involv-

ing international trade, global environmental issues, nuclear proliferation, or humanitarian peacekeeping operations, American involvement—indeed, American leadership—is critical.

The other construction is far grander, holding that the United States has, or could and should have, dominion over world affairs. This spin assumes that the silver bullet to provide world peace comes through the promotion of free-market democracies, by military means if necessary, under the good offices of the United States.

This takes us back to the assumptions of the Bush Doctrine. On one hand, the United States possesses a military “beyond challenge,” as President Bush said throughout 2002. Thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demonstrated capacity of American

arms in the Gulf War in 1991 and the Balkans in 1999, we arrived at a “unipolar moment,” one that should be stretched to become a “unipolar epoch,” according to neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer. Iraq has indeed been a bump, on the road, both McCain and Obama realize, but under their command the United States should expect to retain its military primacy.

Yet power without purpose is ephemeral. Thus the Freedom Agenda and its promise of prosperity and peace, a formulation from which neither McCain nor Obama dissents.

This bipartisan consensus is not accidental. The neoconservatives who authored the doctrine tapped into a deep wellspring of the American psyche, from its religious conviction that we are “a shining city upon the hill” to the Enlightenment’s secular creed that the American

experience—especially its liberal democratic Constitution—provides an inspiration to others to follow. With Woodrow Wilson, a plan was put forward “to make the world safe for democracy” by promoting open markets and democratic government globally. After World War II, the United States accepted leadership of the “free world,” and with the creation of the European Union and the defeat of the Soviet Union, the notion grew that not so much a country as a way of being—free-market democracy—could be the wave of the future. American leadership was nonetheless necessary: we were the indispensable nation.

THE NOTION GREW THAT NOT SO MUCH A COUNTRY AS A WAY OF BEING—FREE-MARKET DEMOCRACY—COULD BE THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE.

It took hard theorizing in the 1990s in the greatest American universities to convert this conviction into a coherent, persuasive ideology. While neoconservatives within the ranks of the Republican Party authored the Bush Doctrine, its intellectual heft derived from concepts developed by academics usually on the Left. Here were the liberal hawks, the progressive imperialists, many of whom have Obama’s ear just as the neo-conservatives have McCain’s.

The concept liberal international-relations experts began to call “democratic peace theory”—defended empirically by Bruce Russett at Yale, theoretically by Andrew Moravcsik at Princeton, and philosophically by John Rawls at Harvard—held that democracies, especially if they have open market economies, are unlikely to go to war with one another.

At the same time, liberals such as Larry Diamond at Stanford formulated a “democratic transition theory,” which overcame the skepticism of an earlier era that liberal democratic government could easily sink roots in just about any part of

the world. A door was open through which most peoples might pass. What was desirable according to democratic peace theory was practically possible.

The final push toward progressive imperialism came thanks to liberal jurists such as Thomas Franck at NYU and Anne-Marie Slaughter at Princeton. In their hands, sovereignty was redefined so that non-democratic regimes that engaged in gross human-rights abuses or amassed weapons of mass destruction might be treated like slave ships or pirates of old and attacked. The “right to intervene” in such circumstances became a “duty to intervene.”

Today such thinking is called “R2P,” signifying a state’s “responsibility to protect” its population from harm, failing which it may be taken over by the liberal world and refashioned into a peace-keeping, free-market democracy.

With these three concepts, a witches’ brew had been concocted. Not only was democratic government deemed morally superior and in the national interest of the United States to see take root, but its expansion was possible and force might be used to accomplish this mission. The formulation of this ideology by intellectuals who were largely supporters of the Democratic Party meant that when the Bush Doctrine was eventually introduced by neoconservatives, it would have bipartisan support. This first became evident when both parties criticized the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic and called on the Clinton administration for intervention.

But pride goeth before the fall. Whatever the success of American arms at certain recent points—from the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 to the taking of

Baghdad in 2003—the death and destruction caused by American intervention, and the weakness of military preparedness, strategy, and tactics for the long haul, are now apparent for all to see. The United States most certainly remains the paramount military power in world affairs. But winning the war was not enough to guarantee winning the peace that momentarily followed. Combining the conviction that America enjoyed unrivalled power with the self-righteous assurance that it had a master plan with which to remake foreign domestic order, and as a consequence reconfigure the entire international system, the Bush Doctrine was a manifest case of imperial hubris.

The problems should be apparent. Peoples who had never known democratic rule would find themselves possessed of unfamiliar political institutions resting on the consent of the governed. Civil orders that had never negotiated a social contract among their various factions—ethnic, religious, or linguistic—would be called upon to exhibit measures of trust and cooperation that they had never before exhibited. Economic arrangements that had favored unaccountable patronage and privilege would give way to market forces and foreign participation. Ancient cultural practices sanctified by familiarity and religious belief—especially the place of women so that the family itself was to be remade—would evolve new ways of understanding individual and group rights and responsibilities. And all this would occur under the benevolent compulsion of American force, which might be mistrusted as more interested in Iraqi oil or Israel’s security than in the well-being of the locals. Progressive imperialism has always held more appeal for those who practice it than those who suffer it.

Today’s backers of the Bush Doctrine claim that the execution of policy was to blame for the American failures in Iraq

and Afghanistan—not the ideas that underpinned the vision of a new world order based on a benevolent American hegemony. So the neoconservatives defend themselves from responsibility for the calamity in the Middle East. Plenty of Democrats keep them company.

Those who expect Barack Obama to depart from the outlines of our current foreign policy forget its deep roots on the Left and underestimate the elite cadre within the Democratic Party urging him to embrace the pretensions of the Bush Doctrine. Liberal hawks working under the auspices of the Progressive Policy Institute of the Democratic Leadership Council (sometimes collaborating with the neoconservative Project for the New American Century) include Michael McFaul, Ronald Asmus, Larry Diamond, Philip Gordon, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Kenneth Pollack. Sens. Hillary Clinton, Joseph Lieberman, Joseph Biden, Evan Bayh, and John Kerry have all been publicly associated. The most active member from the House has been Rahm Emanuel.

In document after document, PPI has pledged allegiance to the task of defending the zone of democratic peace by moving failed states and societies into the camp of market democracies. As a PPI report entitled “Progressive Internationalism: A Democratic National Security Strategy” put it in October 2003, the Bush administration “has not been ambitious or imaginative enough” when it comes to the “belief that America can best defend itself by building a world safe for individual liberty and democracy.” This statement received explicit, public support from Biden, Obama’s running mate.

In March 2004, PPI members Asmus and McFaul published a policy brief on Iraq entitled “Let’s Get Serious About Democracy in the Greater Middle East.” Its core propositions duplicated exactly the neoconservative refrain: the war on

terrorism “must be won politically and with ideas. We need a grand strategy to help these countries transform themselves into the kinds of societies that focus on the needs of their peoples—ones that do not produce people who want to kill us and have the capacity to do so.” To achieve their mission, Asmus and McFaul called for NATO’s involvement in the American-led occupation of the Middle East, a hefty increase in budget appropriations for groups such as the National Endowment for Democracy, and the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Democracy Promotion.

The president of the PPI since its inception in 1989 has been Will Marshall, whose policy prescriptions include:

- “Stay and Win in Iraq”: “The escalating violence prompted facile and mostly misleading analogies between Iraq and Vietnam.”
- “Thinking Bigger”: “Turn NATO into a new anti-terrorist alliance.”
- “Valuing Patriotism”: Democrats “more than anything else need to show the country a party unified behind a new patriotism—a progressive patriotism determined to succeed in Iraq and win the war on terror; to close a yawning cultural gap between Democrats and the military, and to summon a new spirit of national service and national sacrifice.”

In spring 2006, PPI brought out a volume edited by Marshall entitled *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty*. The introduction read:

We are committed to preserving America’s military preeminence. We recognize that a strong military undergirds U.S. global leadership. ... Progressives must champion liberal democracy in deed, not just in rhetoric, as an integral part of a strategy for preventing conflict,

promoting prosperity, and defending human dignity. ... We believe Democrats must reclaim, not abandon, their own tradition of muscular liberalism. ... Progressives and Democrats must not give up the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad just because President Bush has paid it lip service. Advancing democracy—in practice, not just in rhetoric—is fundamentally the Democrats’ legacy, the Democrats’ cause, and the Democrats’ responsibility.

PPI is far from the only group of intellectuals within the Democratic Party championing ideas recycled from the Bush Doctrine. Peter Beinart expressed these same opinions in his book *The Good Fight: Why Liberals—and Only Liberals—Can Win the War on Terror and Make America Great Again*. Similarly, at Princeton, John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter in 2006 brought out a report entitled “Forging a World of Liberty Under Law.” Among its recommendations: a “Concert of Democracies” should be founded to provide a multilateral military force to impose liberal democratic ways on governments that were not up to “PAR,” that is, “popular, accountable, and rights-regarding.”

Obama is surrounded by phalanxes of experts bidding to offer him advice that would keep him under the influence of the Bush Doctrine. There is James Dobbins, the director of Rand’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, who has worked for both the Clinton and Bush administrations and is the editor of two Rand primers on how to run countries taken over by the U.S. military: *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (2007), and *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (2003). Or again, Thomas Carothers at the Carnegie Endowment

Continued on page 34

Court Historian

Andrew Roberts, the Anglosphere's greatest modern mythologist, may be perfectly suited to sanitize the Bush presidency.

By R.J. Stove

CONNOISSEURS OF HOMICIDAL book reviews have long treasured the virtuosic evisceration that British immunologist Sir Peter Medawar performed in 1950 on Teilhard de Chardin, that once fashionable Gallic mountebank. Of Teilhard's *The Phenomenon of Man*, Medawar remarked, "its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself."

Sir Peter's slashing verdict inevitably comes to a mind confronted with the work of currently hip British neocon Andrew Roberts. The historian has an influential admirer in George W. Bush, who after meeting Roberts in a London restaurant invited him to a second date in the White House. "To prove how serious he was," *Vanity Fair's* Vicky Ward reported, "Bush wrote down his personal phone number." Roberts's website boasts that at their later meeting, "he and his wife spent 40 minutes alone with President Bush in the Oval Office." Rumors of a presidential biography—or ghosted autobiography—soon took flight.

Roberts's newfound vogue rests almost entirely upon *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900*. Whether this 754-page blockbuster is the most mendacious tract marketed as non-fiction within the last decade, or whether Roberts genuinely believes the tripe he spouts therein, is among our era's more conspicuous literary puzzles. Nonetheless, this apparent dichotomy proves to be a distinction without a difference.

Looking for candor in Roberts's agitprop is as absurd as seeking it in presentations from Madison Avenue. That is precisely what Roberts has become: not a historian at all but an advertising agent, whose account happens to be the Anglosphere and whose moralizing is as stridently simpleminded as Brecht's.

To expect in Roberts's effusions the smallest nuance or humility makes hunting for four-leaf clovers seem like an intelligent use of one's time. He is incorrigible. Not only must every good deed of British or American rule be lauded till the skies resound with it, but so must every deed that is morally ambiguous or downright repellent.

The Amritsar carnage of 1919, where British forces under Gen. Reginald Dyer slew 379 unarmed Indians? Absolutely justified, according to Roberts, who curiously deduces that but for Dyer, "many more than 379 people would have lost their lives." Hitting prostrate Germany with the Treaty of Versailles? Totally warranted: the only good Kraut is a dead Kraut. Herding Boer women and children into concentration camps, where 35,000 of them perished? Way to go: the only good Boer is a dead Boer. Interning Belfast Catholics, without anything so vulgar as a trial, for no other reason than that they were Belfast Catholics? Yep, the only good bog-trotter ... well, finish the sentence yourself.

FDR's obeisance to Stalin? All the better to defeat America First "fascists." (Roberts has "fascists" on the brain,

having spent pages feverishly denouncing the prewar Teutonophile naïveté of long forgotten British historian Sir Arthur Bryant, while administering to tenured Leninist head-kickers Christopher Hill and Eric Hobsbawm polite slaps on the wrist.) FDR the compulsive lecher? Actively commendable: Roberts hopes "the great man did indeed find some happiness with his lissome secretary." Bombing Germany and Japan into glue? Bring it on. Sinking the General Belgrano during the Falklands crisis? Cool. NATO massacring Serbs? Mega-cool. Almost everything in modern politics that even (or especially) Britain's and America's authentic well-wishers consider a cause of shame, Roberts regards as a crowning splendor.

Curiously, he fails to carry this attitude to its logical conclusion by applauding Harold Macmillan's public-spirited labors in 1945 to give anticommunist refugees firsthand experience of Uncle Joe's compassion; or by demanding that Lieutenant Calley's philanthropic My Lai endeavors be rewarded with a Nobel Peace Prize; or by cheering the 1969 British blockades that released a million skeletal Biafrans from the perils of obesity; or by praising *Roe v. Wade* for having rescued 48 million Americans since 1973 from the terrifying trauma of being born. No doubt a second edition will rectify these gaps.

It is tempting to make an entire article not only from Roberts's forensic amorality but from his outright factual inepti-

tude. In a spasm of revisionist daydreaming, Roberts has announced that the Australian prime minister in 1938 was Robert Menzies. This would have astonished the actual Australian prime minister of that year, who bore the name Joseph Lyons. Presumably relying on one-volume encyclopedias' entries, Roberts never got around to discovering that the Australian leader baptized Joseph Benedict Chifley was known to all his compatriots as Ben Chifley: not, *pace* Roberts, as "Joseph Chifley." Someone might also with benefit have advised Roberts that the Brighton bombing aimed at Margaret Thatcher occurred in 1984, not 1985, and that Nelson Mandela was released from jail in 1990, not 1994. Virginia Woolf could hardly have contributed to the periodical *Encounter*, since she suicided 12 years before it began.

It is equally tempting to expatiate upon Roberts's paroxysmal hissy-fits. Dutch professor Pieter Geyl once wrote a characteristically civilized book bearing the characteristically civilized title *Debates With Historians*. Roberts, if he ever attempted such a book, would need to call it *Screaming Matches Against Historians* or *Chewing Historians' Carpet*.

No such feistiness marks Roberts's behavior toward those equipped with political and military muscle, or their behavior in return. Positively prodigious is the fawning he inspires in Anglophone overlords. They include John Howard, who spent his government's final summer vacation reading *The English-Speaking Peoples* and whose usual approach to high culture evokes that renowned witticism about the "artistic" JFK: "the only piece of music he recognizes is 'Hail to the Chief.'" Having witnessed the undignified reverence for Roberts shown by George W. Bush, Roberts's wife assured London's *Observer*: "I thought I had a crush on him, but it's nothing like the crush President Bush has on him."

Still harder to credit is Roberts's own power-mania, which would defy the most hostile caricaturist. When *The New Republic*, in its April 13, 2007 issue printed an attack on Roberts by journalist Johann Hari, Roberts roared that if such comments had appeared in Britain, "I would sue [Hari] for libel and doubtless take tens of thousands of pounds off him." On July 27, 2008 another London broadsheet, *The Times*, cited Roberts as demanding of Gordon Brown's government a taxpayer-funded regulatory organization to be called Ofhist. The *Times* continued, without the faintest suggestion of irony: "Its task would be to protect what he [Roberts] designates 'proper historians' from incursions by 'amateurs' into writing history books, and to restrain literary editors from commissioning 'C-list celebs' and the writers of 'chick lit' to review such historians' work." No, this is not a joke. When Roberts says he wants to sic the nanny state onto writers whom he dislikes, he means it.

ROBERTS—BASKING AS HE NOW IS IN THE HIGH SUNSHINE OF NEOCON APPROVAL—HAS SLOUGHED THE HABITS OF BORING OLD HISTORIOGRAPHY.

In fairness to the earlier Roberts—and, to quote Dorothy Parker on Il Duce, "I would strip a gear any time in an effort to be square toward that boy"—two of his previous publications, his biographies of Lord Salisbury and of Neville Chamberlain's Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, suggested a certain fundamental engagement with political society, at least with its British aristocratic division. (This aristocratic interest doubtless derived in part from the fact that Roberts has a Kentucky Fried Chicken salesman for a father, almost as glamorous a lineage as having Typhoid Mary for a mother.) But those books' better moments are completely unable to expunge from one's mouth the taste that *The English-Speaking Peoples*

leaves. By what we must infer to be a conscious decision, Roberts—basking as he now is in the high sunshine of neocon approval—has sloughed the habits of boring old historiography the way a snake sloughs its winter skin.

Words cannot convey exactly how frightening a man becomes when he turns from historian to propagandist. The genuine historian must be skeptical by his calling's very nature. Even if he quails at, in Dr. Johnson's immortal phrase, "survey[ing] mankind from China to Peru," he must still survey enough of mankind to realize the sole universally obeyed moral law: there are no universally obeyed moral laws. History is crammed with intelligent people's stupid acts and with stupid people's intelligent acts. With meek liberals who are loathed and with swaggering despots who are loved. With pious Muslims who drink and with pious Byzantines who slaughter. With economic theories that make Country A flourish and make Country B starve.

With humanitarians effecting mass murder and with sleazebags preventing it. Accordingly, categorical imperatives about how *Homo sapiens* should act contradict every day of the historian's experience, and—whatever his own religious beliefs—are best relegated by him to his children's Sunday-school lessons.

Thus, when Bush babbles about how regime change will ensure "an end to tyranny," alarm bells ring inside the historian's head. An end to what sort of tyranny? For how long? Is there not the tyranny of the ballot box and the soundbite as well as the jackboot? Can democracy be exported at all? If so, how, when, and by whom? Can methods workable in America's absence suffice in Amer-

ica's presence? And so forth. Alas, such healthy historiographical doubt seems nowhere to affect policy outcomes, which, to make them more insulting, are generally couched in Blair-style fatuities like "History teaches us ..." (The only thing history taught Blair is that it is always 1938, always Chamberlain at Munich, forever and ever amen.)

Simply to list the historian's attributes is to appreciate afresh how totally the Roberts of 2008 lacks them. Like—although with less excuse than—the hardened "Full Metal Jacket" Marine who muses, "inside every gook there's an American trying to get out," Roberts has no discernible understanding of what it is to be beyond, still less to be gladly beyond, the American empire. It is a truth that, within this empire, we never seem to learn: the world's population does not consist of 6,718,007,462 people busting a gut to be American.

THE ROBERTS-STYLE REVOLUTIONIST ADVOCATES DEMOCRATISM, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND ENDLESS WAR AGAINST "ISLAMOFASCISM."

Roberts's infatuation with the Anglosphere compels him to assume, instead of proving, that the Anglosphere actually exists. But does it, outside neocon fantasies? Did it have any meaning before the Thatcher-Reagan personal friendship or the FDR-Churchill political marriage of convenience? What grounds, historically, are there for concluding that a shared tongue unites peoples? Bernard Shaw's celebrated "divided by a common language" quip suggests the contrary. So, too, for that matter, does the Serbo-Croat experience. Could it not be conjectured that America has owed its entire essence since at least 1776 to the fact of Not Being Britain? But for its Not-Britain-ness, would America even be America? How many American leaders before Reagan actually imagined that an "Anglosphere"

determined their policies, as opposed to being intermittent rhetoric? How many British leaders? (One such leader, Lord Palmerston, famously said the opposite: "we have no permanent allies, only permanent interests." For similar convictions across the pond, consult the Monroe Doctrine and Washington's Farewell Address.) What meliorating effect, pray tell, did this "Anglosphere" have upon Eisenhower's clobbering of Anthony Eden in the Suez affair? Or upon Harold Wilson's refusal to permit British troops in Vietnam? Or—if bilingual Canada is considered an Anglosphere component—upon Pierre Trudeau's "A plague on both your houses" stance toward both America and Britain? What price have Irish-Americans ever put on the Anglosphere's desirability? How much did pro-British sentiment in Australia and, particularly New Zealand, matter against Britain's 1970s support for the European Common

ing Irish and Indian famines through gross incompetence. Can we imagine that Roberts would not be there, spin-doctoring apparatus at the ready, to defend such corpse factories? Indeed, on what logical grounds could he oppose them? We know that atomic warfare as practiced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to say nothing of Dresden's incineration, meets his full approval: "Fortunately," he smugly asserts, "the English-speaking peoples' wars are fought by professional soldiers under the direction of elected politicians, with intellectuals having very little to do with them until they are safely won, after which they can criticize with hindsight and moral superiority." Pius XII, Admiral William Leahy, Bishop Fulton Sheen, and British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe might have disagreed with Roberts on this last point, but what did they know?

"Live not by lies," Solzhenitsyn pleaded. Lenin had an approach far more congenial than Solzhenitsyn's to the likes of Roberts: "Truth," he explained, "is what serves the revolution." So it is with Roberts's notions of truth: they serve the neocon revolution. The old-style revolutionist advocated cloth caps, gulags, a command economy, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Roberts-style revolutionist advocates democratism, sexual liberation, endless war against "Islamofascism," a Ponzi-scheme economy, and the dictatorship of the Anglo. There is no reason for the second apparatchik, any more than the first, to impose on the intellects of the rest of us. Orwell again:

Do remember that dishonesty and cowardice always have to be paid for. Don't imagine that for years on end you can make yourself the boot-licking propagandist of ... any ... regime, and then suddenly return to mental decency. Once a whore, always a whore. ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.

The Candidates' Vices

GIVEN THAT ONLY TWO sitting senators have gone straight to the White House, and both died within three years of taking office, the choice of running mates in this election was unusually important. The results revealed Senator Obama to be as cool and cerebral as Senator McCain is impetuous and visceral and expressed the candidates' flaws as much as their leadership styles. In choosing an establishment figure in Joe Biden, Obama bowed to conventional wisdom and Beltway expectations. McCain, by contrast, stayed true to his habit of impulsive decisions in selecting Sarah Palin, opting at the last minute against Joe Lieberman, his reported favorite.

Contrary to the common portrayal of Palin as the "maverick" pick, the decision is no measure of McCain's break with the Bush administration or the party's corrupt elements. McCain's choice, besides being a concession to political necessity and a sop to disaffected conservatives, has all the marks of Mr. Bush's flawed decision-making: poorly informed, driven by gut reactions, and heedless of consequences. Substantively, McCain and Palin have not repudiated the Bush record. The 2008 ticket resembles nothing so much as another Bush/Cheney ticket in reverse order.

McCain's pick was transparently aimed at shoring up conservatives and poaching disgruntled Clinton voters yet was presented as proof of his reform credentials. But like McCain's own dubious reforms, which include trampling on the First Amendment and pushing for effective immigration amnesty, Palin's record does not bear much scrutiny. Between her support for windfall-profits taxes and acceptance of earmark spending, she is an odd choice to crusade against tax hikes and federal pork.

What is most striking about the Palin selection is the electoral strategy that it represents. Despite having already solidified Republicans behind himself much more than Obama has done with his partisans, McCain was suffering from an enthusiasm gap, which he has now done much to close. Even so, as fewer voters identified themselves as Republicans this year, there was little incentive to generate greater excitement among a dwindling base and more reason to pursue those alienated by the Bush administration. Choosing Palin would have made more sense in previous elections when the GOP's reputation was still reasonably intact, but today it seems an invitation to electoral disaster.

The selections of Biden and Palin show how much the major parties have switched roles in this election. The Democrats have fielded a ticket designed to make a coherent foreign-policy and national-security argument, and they have done so without the flag-waving metooism of Kerry. For their part, the Republicans, a party now defined by its foreign-policy blunder in Iraq, have opted to run almost obsessively on domestic oil drilling and selected their vice-presidential nominee accordingly.

Obama, consistent with his aversion to confronting established interests, selected Biden to acknowledge his lack of credentials in foreign policy and demonstrate his fealty to the Washington consensus on America's role in the world. While McCain may have used more bellicose rhetoric over the war in Georgia, both Biden and Obama have made clear that their views on NATO expansion and relations with Russia are similar to McCain's, and it was Biden's visit to Tbilisi as Foreign Relations Committee chair that clinched the spot for

him. As a supporter of the wars against Yugoslavia and Iraq, Biden represents the antithesis of what many antiwar progressives thought they were going to find in an Obama administration.

Offshore drilling has become virtually the only winning economic issue for Republicans. Party regulars descended into self-parody during the convention when they took up a modified version of a Black Panther slogan, "Drill, baby, drill." It is fitting, then, that the VP nominee is governor of our largest petrostate and that her main, perhaps only, area of policy expertise is energy. No doubt the national GOP hopes to use Palin and drilling to ride popular discontent with high gas prices to victory. This would help account for the paucity of other economic policy ideas on offer in St. Paul. Regardless, it is a political strategy based on the chimera of energy independence and demagoguery against foreign oil producers to advance a meddlesome foreign-policy agenda.

It was difficult to watch the Republican convention and not have a feeling of déjà vu over Palin's rapturous reception. Just as George W. Bush was acclaimed as "one of us" by many conservatives who had been scared into his arms by John McCain in the 2000 primaries, Palin has received the same enthusiastic endorsement on a symbolic, identity-driven basis, despite being chosen by the same man the Right once found so repugnant. After eight years of seeing the last "reformer with results" in action, most conservatives appear to have learned nothing about how the GOP manipulates them and wins their votes. If McCain prevails, they will get more of the same policies that have brought Republicans to their current predicament. ■

Arts & Letters

FILM

[The Women]

I Prefer the Older Women

By Steve Sailer

ISN'T IT IRRITATING when a know-it-all movie critic trashes a new release just because it's not as good as its classic source, whether that be an older film, book, play, TV show, or theme-park ride? That's a tiresome routine because it's mathematically certain that most new movies will be comparatively worse than the material on which they are based. The average new movie is inevitably average in quality, while the famous old works that Hollywood spends tens of millions adapting into new flicks were almost all above average.

On the other hand, the differences between the source and the new release offer useful clues to the filmmakers' point of view, and can illustrate the evolution of attitudes over the decades.

Therefore, my rule as a reviewer is to watch the new film first to see what my unbiased reaction is, then read the book or watch the old DVD.

The new version of "The Women" illustrates the value of this approach. It had been a couple of decades since I'd seen George Cukor's 1939 version of the satirical play by Clare Booth Luce (the future *grande dame* of the American Right) about Park Avenue ladies who

lunch. So I found the new film—a chick-flick-buddy comedy about Mary (Meg Ryan) and Sylvia (Annette Bening), the squabbling best friends forever who team up again to win Mary's husband back from the scheming perfume counter vixen Crystal (Eva Mendes)—to be quite likable.

Compared to last summer's hit, "Sex and the City," "The Women" is shorter, somewhat funnier, less tawdry, and Ryan is easier on the eyes than Sarah Jessica Parker. Some of the stars appear too Botoxed to manage understated facial expressions, but we don't live in an age of subtlety, so little is lost.

But then I watched the original from Hollywood's *annus mirabilis* of 1939, and it makes the 2008 effort seem like *The Importance of Being Earnest* rewritten to serve as a very special episode of "The Oprah Winfrey Show."

Norma Shearer, the stubby, cross-eyed Canadian whose indomitable determination made her Queen of MGM, brought her refinement and silent movie-acting skills to the role of Mary, the betrayed upper-class wife bravely trying to keep up the façade while crumbling inside. Shearer's real-life rival, Joan Crawford, who now seems too much the screen legend to be believable in most of her roles, was perfectly cast as the phony gold-digger Crystal. When playing herself—an ambitious broad on the make trying to act the lovely lady—she's awfully appealing.

And, in her first comic role, the great comedienne Rosalind Russell ("His Girl Friday" and "Auntie Mame") prefigured the "I Love Lucy" TV series by a decade with the slapstick willfulness of her Sylvia. In contrast to Bening's sympa-

thetic 2008 portrayal of Sylvia as a high-minded fashion magazine editor whose publisher wants her to run sleazy cover stories on "How to Get Revenge," Russell's Sylvia was a spoiled stinker in Jungle Red nail polish who spreads poisonous gossip about Mary's marital troubles out of malicious glee.

The remake was intentionally declawed by its writer-director Diane English, creator of "Murphy Brown," out of feminist loyalty to the team. English complained, "the movie had very old-fashioned ideas that were in great need of updating. ... The original play and film were written as a poison pen letter to shallow society women who would stab each other in the back over a man. ... I had to figure out a way to shift the focus. I wanted to celebrate women..."

Self-esteem boosting female empowerment plot developments ahoy! (Aren't there any bitchy gay men left in Hollywood who could have done for the remake what Cukor did in 1939?)

Another question the new version raises is whether a classic comedy of manners can be adapted to an era that disdains manners as pretentious and undemocratic? The upper class just isn't as entertaining as it used to be. After the 1960s social revolution, the rich kept most of their privileges (such as being rich), but shed their traditional responsibility of edifying the masses with their starchy manners and dress. The current cult of authenticity allows the upper crust to live more casual, comfortable lives—no more dressing for dinner—but, as the new "Women" demonstrates, less amusing ones, too. ■

Rated PG-13 for sex-related material, language, and some drug use.

BOOKS

[*The New Case Against Immigration: Both Legal and Illegal*, Mark Krikorian, *Sentinel*, 304 pages]

Assimilating to the GOP

By Scott McConnell

NO CONTEMPORARY American political movement has had more difficulty finding an effective tone than the immigration-reform lobby. Its aim of slowing down the rate of immigration has long been supported by popular opinion, but it has never found majority elite support in either party. The eloquent arguments pushed by *National Review* in the early 1990s, particularly Peter Brimelow's powerful brief for the American nation as a product of shared culture and ethnicity, were for the most part rejected or shunned by the conservative establishment, which on this issue did not even pretend to follow the impulses of its populist base.

Yet for those convinced that the United States needed a better immigration policy, Republican establishment rejection did not end the matter. A dozen years ago, when I first saw Mark Krikorian—then the new director of the Center for Immigration Studies—I thought he was the best possible voice for making the immigration-restriction argument persuasive to Americans. Young, wonkish, sufficiently ethnic in background and sensibility to be empathetic to the immigrant experience, highly intelligent with a firm grasp of all the policy detail deployed by both sides in the debate, Krikorian had an uncanny ability to normalize the issue, to dampen its emotive aspects and defuse the smear words (nativist, racist, etc.) that proponents of high immigration habitually threw at their opponents. The

growth in influence of the Center for Immigration Studies under his leadership confirms this judgment. Especially striking is the headway Krikorian has made in courting influential Republicans: this book is blurbed by both David Frum and Bill Bennett. But history works in curious ways, and the embrace of immigration reform by the conservative establishment presents some difficulties of its own.

Krikorian's excellent *New Case Against Immigration* is a lucid elaboration of arguments made by CIS during the past decade. What will strike many as new is his insistence that the trouble is not that immigrants aren't as smart, industrious, or able to assimilate as the storied Ellis Islanders but that America has so changed as to put mass immigration in an entirely different context. Krikorian explicitly rejects the notion that the predominantly Mexican ethnicity of the new immigration is an issue, pointing out that America has always had an elastic definition of "white" (which used to exclude Germans and later Irish) and has steadily expanded it. But the volume of the current influx is a problem, and so are other factors that make the present immigration more problematic than the past.

Central to Krikorian's thesis is the fact that the United States was once itself a developing country—most people farmed, few were schooled. If it took in millions of poor and unskilled, the newcomers were coming to a country in which the natives were generally on the same socioeconomic level. There was a national commitment on the part of America's elites to assimilation at the highest level: American presidents ridiculed the notion of dual citizenship. The immigrants themselves, coming in great part from traditional rural societies, had thin pre-existing national allegiances. Moreover, there was scant opportunity for governments overseas to exert influence over the immigration streams entering our country. The contrasts with today are evident: Krikorian carefully documents the egregious efforts that Mexico, using its growing

network of consulates, is now making to keep its emigrants loyal to their mother country. For other immigrants, modern travel and communication render a binationalism of the heart altogether plausible. There are as yet not that many examples of "Americans" who have run for office in their native countries, but there are enough to serve as harbinger of the kind of postnational immigrant who has no wish to assimilate emotionally into the United States. The fact that most new immigrants speak Spanish means that many new arrivals can live entirely in Spanish-speaking environments, do business in Spanish, conduct legal affairs in Spanish, and come in no contact with American norms at all.

Or, perhaps, what used to be American norms. A great part of Krikorian's argument depends on his analysis of the American elite, which is "post-American," lacking, as he puts it, "visceral attachment to the American national community." Multiculturalism is one byproduct of this mindset: it means that, in Krikorian's phrase, America "almost sacralizes" group identities that would otherwise be fluid and optional. The civil-rights revolution has persuaded the country to adopt as its official story the seemingly irredeemable racism of whites and therefore create governmental institutions to keep a thumb on the scale for minorities for the indefinite future. All of these factors militate against Hispanic or Asian immigrants coming to consider themselves 100 percent American.

Diversity of this sort has other prices. Krikorian cites Robert Putnam, the *Bowling Alone* sociologist, who has found that highly diverse communities have great deficits in social trust and lack the "common good" sentiment that is one of the wellsprings of human happiness.

There are also more tangible consequences. When a developed country imports millions of mostly unskilled workers, the result is lower wages for less educated, native-born skilled workers and widening income inequality. When labor is cheap, business has less incentive to create or utilize technological innovations, to substitute machines

for human muscle. High immigration means less social and economic equality.

Since 9/11, there has been a significant security component to immigration as well. While America's Muslim immigrants have not carried out major terrorist acts, Europe's much larger Muslim enclaves have generated terrorists, and there's no logical reason why the alienation and militancy rife among Paris and London's second- and third-generation immigrants couldn't eventually take root here.

It is significant that Krikorian's argument addresses the sheer size of America's immigration intake and does not especially target illegal immigration. Politicians haven't adopted this line, finding it easier to rail against illegals—while the open-borders lobby counters by proposing to legalize the illegals. But Krikorian recognizes that a decent society is not going to refuse schooling or medical care to people without papers and that the immigration problem is rooted in numbers, not illegality. The negative consequences of high rates of immigration remain whether the new entrants sneak across the border or are relatives by marriage of someone who arrived a dozen years ago. Effective reform, as recommended by the Barbara Jordan-chaired U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform in 1995, requires ending the automatic visa rights granted to "family member" immigrants that effectively cede control of who can enter the United States to the new immigrants themselves. The illegal alien problem can be substantially mitigated by simply making it difficult for people to work illegally.

Krikorian's arguments are a blend of the new (those stressing the incompatibility of high immigration with modern postindustrial society) with those heard in the immigration-reform movement for a generation, presented with measured rhetoric and unimpeachable logic. But the logic itself won't turn the tables on immigration reform in the United States—where, once again, both major parties have chosen candidates with no interest in reducing the immigrant flow. Still, the movement is now in a different political environment than it was in the

1990s: both more rooted in the Republican Party and more of a mass movement. I believe Krikorian welcomes these developments.

The main line of demarcation is 9/11 and the subsequent Iraq War, now at the centerpiece of American political divisions. Have these watersheds changed the way Americans think about immigration? Should they?

At one level, their effect is obvious. In the week after 9/11, George W. Bush was forced to cancel plans to forge a grand agreement with Mexico's president Vicente Fox to legalize illegal aliens, a deal that may still be politically impossible. The hostility of the major neoconservative voices toward immigration, intense during the 1990s, has become muddled.

As the immigration-reduction movement has sunk deeper roots into the conservative movement and begun to acquire a mass-electoral base, it has also picked up some of the political style and impulses of the prowar Right. Talk-radio hosts who are anti-immigrant are especially anti-Muslim and noisy enthusiasts for bombing other countries. (Michael Savage is the most prominent but not sole example.) At least impressionistically, the immigration-reform movement is attracting people from the same social strata as those volunteering for military service: working-class whites. And while the rush of wartime patriotism has helped galvanize immigration reform, it raises issues the movement didn't face in the 1990s.

More than 30 years ago, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan wrote that the immigration process, because it regulates the ethnic composition of the American electorate, was "the single most important determinant of American foreign policy." While that foreign policy was responsive to many elements, it responded "probably first of all to the primal factor of ethnicity."

It was a bold assertion, debatable then as now at many levels. But one fact seems indisputable: those from the new immigrant groups have played a very secondary role in the Bush/McCain for-

eign policy—torture apologist John Yoo being a notable exception. Asian-Americans, educationally and professionally on track to become a growing part of America's elite, have evinced very little enthusiasm for the War Party agenda. While Hispanics have volunteered in great numbers for military service, the nascent Latino political class, largely Democratic, shows almost no inclination to tub thump about democracy in the Middle East, striking Iran, or rolling back Russian influence in the Caucasus. To the extent that the existing American political class is now given to grandiose and probably self-destructive visions of America's role in the world, modifying its composition through immigration seems much less of a bad idea than it might have ten years ago.

And if Mexico has indeed begun an extraterritorial campaign to retain the political allegiance of Mexicans in El Norte, where does this rank on the outrage scale relative to igniting a "preventive war," or to some of the ideas circulating the Beltway about promoting America's "global hegemony"?

In the 1990s, immigration reform seemed (at its most attractive) linked to concepts like prudence and self-restraint. It had such backers as Eugene McCarthy, George Kennan, and Samuel Huntington—men with a pronounced and realistic sense of America's limits. It seemed to say, without expressions of hostility to other nations or peoples, that it was a risky and unnecessary thing to shake up America's social and ethnic structure by importing millions of poor.

By becoming part and parcel of the Republican Right, the immigration-reform movement risks becoming absorbed by the Right's jingoism, turning into another means of expressing American superiority over foreigners, people to be kept out at home and bombed abroad. This may not be Krikorian's sentiment, but it is the mindset of many of the companions with whom the immigration-reform movement now travels. While such allies may fuel the movement's success, they render it a mixed blessing. ■

[*Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America*, Rick Perlstein, Scribner, 896 pages]

Tricky Rick

By Walter M. Hudson

WHEN RICHARD NIXON won the White House in 1968, he was what America did not need but may have deserved. His presidency resulted in massive distrust and cynicism toward government and authority in general, though this was by no means all bad. America had placed too much power and faith in the Cold War presidents. The job was overwhelming for one man—perhaps the only time in history where the fate of humanity was vested in one office—and the era's "crisis psychology," as David Halberstam termed it, created an atmosphere in which anything was permitted to defeat a political opponent. Your adversary had no rulebook, the thinking went, so you couldn't afford one either.

Does Nixon's impressive yet nefarious rise to power make him kind of a perverse epic hero of the late 1960s? As a man who drove himself to the top despite his opponents and—most of all—himself? As a man who helped create a nation of red and blue states, attack-dog politics, and cultural warfare? This is what Rick Perlstein, previously the author of a good biography of Barry Goldwater, asserts but fails to prove in *Nixonland*.

Of course, to begin to understand how Nixon could win the presidency, one needs to understand the era in which he reached the summit of power: the climactic high 1960s, from 1968 to 1972, the time of maximum social unrest. Though it is hard to believe now, America seemed to be falling apart. In 1969, the usually staid *Wall Street Journal* asserted that the U.S. was in the midst of a guerrilla war within its own borders.

Remember the comforting, black-and-white footage of the March on

Washington in 1963. In retrospect, it's a startling picture of old, dignified America—decorum and respectability abound: men in coats and ties, women in modest dresses, noble speeches appealing to better angels and dreams of a brighter future. It's painful to flash forward half a decade and see in Technicolor what appears to be insanity: fools such as Jerry Rubin and Bernadine Dohrn prancing around, praising Charles Manson and telling kids to kill their parents.

What happened in the interim? Why did America suffer, as one wag called it, a "psychedelic breakdown?" As Perlstein points out, in 1964 the Democrats had crushed Goldwater. In an awesome display of the ambition and hubris of the modern West, LBJ and a Democratic Congress promised a Great Society, "abundance and liberty for all." And what instead did the people get? "America plunged into chaos," as Perlstein puts it. The crisis was mild compared to, say, France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, but to complacent Middle America, it was terrifying: riots in the cities, skyrocketing crime rates, open promiscuity and obscenity, widespread drug abuse, campus disruption, stalemate if not defeat in Vietnam, breakdown of family life. "All this moral anarchy," writes Perlstein, "all of it felt linked."

In Perlstein's account, Nixon provides the skeleton key to understanding the period. Indeed, the ascendancy of the Silent Majority—Red State America, in its more recent guise—is coded in terms of Nixon's life story. The horrified Middle Americans that elected and supported him were "Orthogonians"—the term Nixon himself gave to the fraternity he co-founded at Whittier College for kids who weren't the elite. Orthogonians were hardly downtrodden, though. According to Perlstein, they were "Martyrs who were really not martyrs, oppressors who were not really oppressors: a class politics for the white middle class." The entitled ones were Whittier's elite fraternity of "Franklins." And Nixon fought a personal battle against Franklins all his life—the Kennedys,

most prominently. He rose to power because he perfectly reflected "Orthogonian" rage and anxiety. He was, after all, one to them to his core.

This all seems too clever by half, and Perlstein carries his thesis for more than 700 pages. Throughout the book, he refers to Franklins and Orthogonians in various political guises, his style combining a kind of New Journalist hip argot with metafictional irony—at times, one might say, Tom Wolfe, at others, Thomas Pynchon. So we read cool and clever chapter titles ("In Which a Cruise Ship Full of Governors Inspires Considerations on the Nature of Old and New Politics"); you-are-there descriptions of the Watts riots and the '68 Democratic convention; and smart-Alec, tongue-just-enough-in-cheek commentary. ("Now that farmers were afraid that Martin Luther King would send Negro biker gangs to rape their children, the Republican restoration was inevitable.") At the center of the maelstrom, the trickster himself is always there—always prevailing, jiu-jitsu-ing his opponents by any means necessary.

Amusing, and even exciting at first, the book's sprawling narrative becomes wearying, condescending, and ultimately puerile. Its slapdash tone betrays a willingness to play fast and loose with the facts and to provide overly simple explanations. Perlstein writes, "In the State of the Union address the president said his first economic priority was 'controlling inflation.' He lied." That is a highly dubious assertion, at best. In fact, Nixon was more concerned about inflation than unemployment in his first year in office, even willing to see unemployment rise if it would help curb inflation. Perlstein calls Nixon's creation of the EPA "less noble the closer you looked: its 3560 employees all came from existing agencies; its 1.4 billion budget taken from existing programs, the only difference being that these previously scattered centers of authority were now directly controlled from the White House." But wait a minute—could it be that these "scattered centers of authority" were

centralized in a sincere attempt to improve the management of environmental issues?

Perlstein's dislike of Nixon—admittedly he is not hard to dislike—gets the better of him. He overstates the case that Nixon sabotaged the '68 negotiations with the North Vietnamese. The implication is that, in so doing, he ensured that Hubert Humphrey would lose the election. This reductionism is too easy: Saigon probably would have rejected negotiations without the Republican-woman-in-Asia Anna Chennault's prodings—and, of course, LBJ was the one illegally wiretapping Chennault anyway. Even when posing as a balanced historian, Perlstein casts Nixon in the worst possible light. "In the middle of March [1969], Nixon ordered the bombing of the sections of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that meandered through Cambodia," he writes. He does not mention that Nixon actually debated whether to bomb and ultimately acquiesced to Kissinger, who more than once goaded his commander in chief into foolish positions. On the other hand, Nixon did not bomb North

at the University of Tennessee with Rev. Billy Graham is recorded as a "political contrivance." And then he comes up with this gem of a slander by association:

James Buckley had been one of the Catholic conservatives outraged by New York's abortion bill in April (Not as outraged, however as the Buckley friend Brent Bozell. When his group Los Hijos de Tormenta—Sons of Thunder, after the Spanish fascist group—learned that George Washington University hospital was performing abortions...

Ipso facto presto. With legerdemain and insinuation, antiabortion Catholics are equated with members of the Caudillo's storm-trooping Falange. Such criticism may seem like cherry-picking, but this is the price Perlstein pays for his freewheeling narrative. He wants to be the historian equivalent of Oliver Stone, relying on existentialist truths, yet he does not employ the historical facts and hard evidence that are the most existential things the past can provide. The rest is whimsy.

WITH LEGERDEMAIN AND INSINUATION, ANTIABORTION CATHOLICS ARE EQUATED WITH MEMBERS OF THE CAUDILLO'S STORM-TROOPING FALANGE.

Korea after a U.S. spy plane was shot down off that country's coast, largely acceding to the advice of Secretary of State William Rogers and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. Perlstein's narrative conceals that, even in the heart of Nixonland, presidential decisions weren't purely Nixonian.

But Perlstein's problem is not just with Nixon. He does not, to put it mildly, like Orthodoxians. He indicts them all, repeatedly. They practice "jury nullification" when some Chicago jurors acquit a cop accused of beating Chicago protesters. They don't deserve their economic success. ("Through no agency of their own, Chicago's white ethnics were the beneficiaries of an urban planning miracle.") Their meetings and rallies are just smarmy patriotism: the 1971 Youth Day

This leads to deeper, more essential problems with *Nixonland*. Perlstein cannot corral the impossible 1960s. He rightly rejects patterns that didn't exist. No, antiwar protestors were not mere puppets of communist masters. No, there was not any conspiratorial connection between black radicals, student radicals, the New Left, and the counterculture. These groups were more often at odds than allied. Yet Perlstein himself falls prey to pattern-making compulsions. One implied narrative of *Nixonland* is easy to follow: in the late 1960s, as the civil-rights movement moved north, gloating "Dixie gargoyles" full of race-hate and evil took over the soul of the Republican Party, with Nixon orchestrating the whole thing. The working-class "Pucinskis and Rostekowskis" of

Chicago and Milwaukee were manipulated to react in terror as they saw their cities fall into the hands of minorities. They turned to Nixon to save them.

The trouble is that not everyone, perhaps not even that many, of those who voted for Tricky Dick were closet racists—no more than every early 20th-century union member was a communist or every midcentury communist a Stalinist. Not all of them were Orthodoxians; some had marched in 1963. They tended to take seriously—too seriously, it seems—the stated ambitions of radicals to destroy the American society in which they worked hard and raised their families. Many probably thought life was bigger than politics, but they were dragged into the fight by many of the political-is-personal New Left. All this complexity de-links the narrative. This is why, for instance, Gerard DeGroot's recent, shambolic *The Sixties Unplugged* is better history than *Nixonland*. In that book, Nixon doesn't divide America; all is fracture and fissure. Nobody dominates, nobody masters the moment, and in the end nobody really wins.

To deal with the complexity that was Richard Nixon, one needs more than Perlstein's sneering and heavy-handed innuendoes. In this book, the president is little more than a political confidence man. A better book, and one Perlstein relies on heavily, is Richard Reeves's *Nixon: Alone in the White House*. Reeves gets closer to the bone and provides a truer psychological portrait of a man who was solitude incarnate, even among his inner circle. Robert Lowell once wrote, "Pity the monsters." Perhaps we don't have to pity, but good history at least requires human empathy and close attention—*Nixonland* has neither. The past in question is too big and unruly to be lain at the feet of one man, even the chief Orthodoxian himself, Richard Milhous Nixon. ■

Walter M. Hudson resides in the Washington, D.C. area and has written reviews and articles for *Modern Age*, *Military Review*, and *The Latin Mass* magazine.

[*The Sixties Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade*, Gerard DeGroot, Harvard University Press, 450 pages]

Counter-Counterculture

By Septimus Waugh

I AM A “BABY BOOMER,” and my parents belong to the “Duck and Cover” generation. Baby Boomers were the product of increased copulative opportunities afforded by the end of the Second World War, and the Duck and Covers, having unleashed the power of the atom bomb, lived in guilty fear that another power—namely the Russians—might return the compliment. I remember dragging my Baby Boomer body up to my bedroom and blubbing after hearing a somewhat flippant Duck and Cover conversation between my parents at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Apparently we were all going to die because there was about to be an atomic war.

Baby Boomers were the youth of the 1960s, and a large section of *The Sixties Unplugged* deals with the youth “happenings” and movements that started in reaction to the Cold War caution of our parents’ generation. For us, this book has particular resonance, made stronger by DeGroot’s attitude to history. In an article entitled “When Nothing Happened” in *The Journal of Mundane Behaviour*, he argued that the writing of history is too influenced by what is interesting and newsworthy to be a true reflection of the past, which is made up of the boring and humdrum events of survival. By concentrating on extraordinary events, historians, he complained, were pandering to myth, though to tell the true tale of the past would be boring.

DeGroot’s historical method could be summed up as “describe and debunk,” an entertaining approach that involves telling the myth with all its excitement, producing some good jokes by way of

debunking it, and adding a few mundane details made fascinating by their setting.

Enjoyable irrelevancies are sprinkled through this book, like seasoning on a delicious dish. In an essay on the genesis of the transistor radio, DeGroot reveals that, when the Japanese electronics firm Totsuko—forerunner of Sony—discovered that true marketability lay in being pocketsize, it had shirts made for its salesmen with pockets large enough to fit Totsuko radios. These nuggets provide good gossip material for ageing Baby Boomers, if only we can retain the information long enough to reach the dinner table.

DeGroot points out that very few of us ever went near the great sixties happenings. A miniscule percentage made it to Woodstock or Haight-Ashbury. Those who attended the Grosvenor Square riots in England, the Chicago convention riots, or the Berkeley sit-in would be statistically nonexistent as representatives of our generation. What we all share, however, is the myth of what happened, propagated for us by the newspapers and journalists. We have been content with that myth, convincing ourselves in the retelling that we were witnesses.

AN ESSAY ON THE SEXUAL MORES OF THE SIXTIES RELIEVED A LONG-HELD ANXIETY: HAD I SOMEHOW MISSED OUT ON ALL THAT FREE LOVE?

My 1960s were spent largely in a monastic boarding school in the west of England. There, like the Lady of Shallot, my school chums and I could but glimpse the events of the outside world as in a mirror. By 1968, however, two of the events dealt with by this book had impinged enough to affect our small community: the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and the Second Vatican Council. One enterprising boy, apparently inspired by protests against the war, collected up all our military uniforms on the eve of a general inspection by some military bigwig and flung them into the school swimming pool. The shock waves were palpable. The aston-

ishment was even greater, though, when a young monk, nicknamed Kev the Rev, interrupted on a religious instruction class to tell us that the pope’s *Humanae Vitae* pronouncement was a load of bunkum. At the time we were appalled that a monk could so disrespect a pope. We had no clue that the revolutionary Dom Kevin was heretically defying the Holy Father’s pronouncement on contraception—a subject that was not on the curriculum. The penny finally dropped while reading DeGroot’s excellent essay debunking the mythology of the Second Vatican Council.

The last gasp of the 1960s passed me by because I went from the monastery to teach in a Catholic mission school in Tanzania, from which the trials and tribulations of the youth of Europe and America were even more remote. So I really am one of the great majority that DeGroot describes whose view of the past is not informed by the historical events recorded in his book but whose image of the world has been formed by the standard reportage of those events.

An essay on the sexual mores of the sixties relieved a long-held anxiety: had I somehow missed out on all that free love? “Sixties sexual rebels seldom made

love,” DeGroot notes, “They f---d.” I had done neither. Those like myself who were too “uptight” to partake will be gratified by the horrified descriptions of orgies and recantations by former free-love advocates contained in this book. One of many well-chosen and pithy quotes comes from Beryl Bainbridge on the subject of the pill: “In spite of all the scientific advances there wasn’t a pill invented, and we women knew it, that could stop your heart from being broken.” What balm to the monogamous soul.

DeGroot tells the story of the sixties with great pace and verve, organizing his material, in the way of soap operas,

to hold the interest of as wide an audience as possible. The story of the United States' growing involvement in Vietnam is interspersed with and interrupted by chapters on the civil-rights movement. Light relief is provided by chapters on Europe: one on the brawl between the foppish Mods and the dirty Rockers in Margate, England introduces the more socially challenging Watts riots in Los Angeles during that long hot summer.

At each end of the book are two entertaining essays on the juridical treatment of obscenity: the trial of Penguin for publishing an unexpurgated version of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* started the sixties, and the *Oz* magazine's "school kid's issue" trial ended them. In his essay on the *Lady Chatterley* case, DeGroot quotes the prosecutor's description of his modus operandi: "I put my feet up on the desk and start reading. If I get an erection we prosecute" and notes wryly, "On that standard, Chatterley seemed a filthy book worthy of a ban."

DeGroot, an American, is much more charitable about the youth movements of Europe than those of America, toward whom he is amusingly and uniformly censorious. I suspect that it is a case of familiarity breeding contempt. Discussing the Port Huron declaration by the Students for a Democratic Society at the start of the sixties, he writes, "The decade produced few documents more boring, but S.D.S. activists, being dull, loved it." When dealing with the Yippies, Weathermen, and Black Panthers, his prose becomes incandescent with disgust. Mods, on the other hand, merely amuse him, and he is polite about Marxist European revolutionaries such as Rudi Dutschke and Danny Cohn-Bendit. He positively approves, moreover, of the police-baiting antics of the Dutch Provos. The Provos were peaceful anarchists who carried out a series of "white campaigns," the first of which entailed placing white bicycles around Amsterdam for the use of whoever wished to ride them. The police foolishly confiscated the bicycles because they offended their sense of order, whereupon the Provos unleashed

a series of "white rumor" campaigns threatening enormous demonstrations against the police. The gullible Dutch law enforcers fell for them, put Amsterdam under a state of emergency, and annoyed the Dutch populace considerably with an absurd show of force, especially after no demonstrations materialized. The Provos' campaigns were peculiarly effective. The Amsterdam city council took to providing free bicycles for the use of its citizenry, and the Dutch police learned the error of their ways and became the most liberal and relaxed police force in the world.

There is a darker side to this book, intent as it is on showing us that our rose-tinted view of the sixties is an illusion. DeGroot points out the massacres that we never knew about. Tlatelolco in Mexico, for example, was the scene of the slaughter of 200 or so protesters by the Mexican army on the eve of the 1968 Olympics. In comparison, the notorious Sharpeville massacre in South Africa pales into insignificance. The Mexicans effectively hid the incident from world view, while in another part of the world, Indonesia, the CIA and the British Foreign Service managed to cover up the extent of the killings that happened as Suharto ousted Sukarno.

I left Tanzania in 1969, wearing a Mao suit with a translation of the Little Red Book in the pocket, firm in the illusion that China would lead the world to a better future. DeGroot's portrait of the Orient in the sixties has finally hammered home the horror of the Cultural Revolution, though I am not entirely convinced of the veracity of his assertion, harvested from the Internet, that the cafeteria of Wuxuan Revolutionary Committee had human flesh on its menu. Is DeGroot merely replacing one myth with another? But even if some of his stories have to be taken with a pinch of salt, this book is a wonderful fusion feast for anyone who picks it up. ■

Septimus Waugh is a carpenter and woodcarver living in Devon, England. His website is www.septimuswaugh.co.uk.

Bush Doctrine

Continued from page 23

for International Peace is writing that democracy promotion should remain a central theme of the nation's foreign policy, indeed that it never played a major role in the thinking behind the Bush Doctrine. Other Obama advisers include Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon at Brookings, both of whom have expressed views aligned with Bush Doctrine thinking.

Thus it came as no surprise that when Russia invaded Georgia, both McCain and Obama were quick to denounce Moscow in terms that failed to criticize the Bush administration's provocative efforts both to push NATO to Russia's borders by incorporating both Georgia and Ukraine and placing an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. To be sure, Obama recognized that the Georgians had fired first in South Ossetia, and he did not try to match McCain's assertion that "We are all Georgians now." Still, Obama did make it clear that Russia was the culprit in this affair, reiterated his support for bringing Georgia into NATO, and encouraged Biden to make a trip to Tbilisi to reassure Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that support for his cause in the U.S. was bipartisan. In his deliberations, Obama relied on advice from PPI member Michael McFaul as well as support from such Democratic notables as Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Strobe Talbott.

Americans are therefore right to be suspicious of the leaders of both parties. McCain and Obama both continue to talk in terms of American global hegemony based on military might and on a blueprint for reordering of foreign countries into market democracies. They not only fail to renounce the Bush Doctrine—they repeat its folly. ■

Tony Smith is the Cornelia M. Jackson Professor of Political Science at Tufts University.

Safe at Home

When in May Batavia Muckdogs general manager Dave Wellenzohn told me that as club vice president and resident minor-league baseball litterateur I was to

be honored with “Bill Kauffman Day,” I replied, gamely if lamely, “Every day is Bill Kauffman Day.”

To my horror, the schedule soon appeared with the Sept. 4 game so denominated. For three months, I prayed for a rainout—unavailingly. For as grateful as I was to Dave, no one with even a partially functioning nimrod detector can fail to be humiliated by such a day.

“What are you going to do on Bill Kauffman Day?” I heard all summer long. Bobbleheads were out, not because they’re *infra dig*, but rather too expensive. I knew I couldn’t follow through on my threat to take the field and read from my collected works in a fake English accent as a homonymic nod to Andy Kaufman. Throwing out the first pitch was mandatory: friends placed wagers on whether I’d reach the plate. (Bets were off in the event of a strong wind.)

I regarded this as a sequel to last summer’s Baseball Poetry Night or, as we called it, Shoving Culture Down Fans’ Throats Night. Team president Brian Paris and I misconceived the idea. With the recitative assistance of my daughter Gretel and museum director Pat Weissend, we filled the between-innings air of a game against the Auburn Doubledays with baseball verse by everyone from Charles Bukowski to Grantland Rice. It was a catastrophe. My Batavia, God bless her, is poetry in repose to me, but as for poetry response ... let’s just say that when Brian asked the fans, “Do you want another poem or a song?” the shouts of “Song!” rivaled

the New Testament crowd’s cry of “Free Barabbas!”

Again this year, Brian manned the PA system for the last days of the season. For Bill Kauffman Day, I urged an Americana diet of Townes Van Zandt, Lucinda Williams, Tom Russell, and the local Ghost Riders, the best unsigned country band in America, but Brian played Michael Bublé. Oh well, he’s still Mr. Irrepressible of Batavia baseball.

Serves me right, anyway. I am a chronic critic of the blaring of amplified music and sound effects during games. My friend Tom Williams and I want someday to sponsor a Pastoral Night in which the only sounds are of ball hitting glove, bat hitting ball, umpire declarations, and the sweet buzz of friends talking in the bleachers and grandstand.

FOR THREE MONTHS, I PRAYED FOR A RAINOUT—UNAVAILINGLY.

Brian kicked off BK Day with a reprise of my disastrous oration of Bukowski’s “Betting on the Muse,” which begins “Jimmie Foxx died an alcoholic in a skidrow hotel room.” I thought of it as a cautionary tale for the boys.

Dave called me onto the field and out I shambled, wondering, during his funny and much-appreciated encomium, if I should pitch from the stretch or full windup.

Between innings we gave away copies of my books to those who answered questions about Batavia baseball history. I feared that folks would answer the questions but then spurn the

prizes. I’d find books littering the stands like dehiscent peanut shells. But neighbors act neighborly.

Gretel and her friend Megan sang the national anthem mellifluously. During the seventh-inning stretch, now unfortunately scored in so many ballparks by that empty cloud of bombast “God Bless America,” the girls ignored post-9/11 protocol and instead sang my favorite, “America the Beautiful.”

Gretel and Megan weren’t past “Oh beautiful ...” when a heckler started in from the beer deck: “Wrong song! Wrong song!” The girls got a huge kick out of it. How many singers have ever been jeered during “America the Beautiful”?


The Muckdogs lost, 13-4. Maybe Bukowski’s derelict warning induced a dugout-wide fit of melancholia. Aptly, I suppose, the go-ahead run was allowed by our favorite Muckdog, a sidearm reliever who lists his hobbies as “reading and poetry.” (The commonest avocation among the boys is “video games.”) Brian wisely

ignored my request to play “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door” in the bottom of the ninth.

About that first pitch. After telling the crowd that my brother had promised to buy everyone in the stands a beer if I didn’t throw a strike, I threw a fastball right down the pipe. I thought the radar gun clocked it in the low 80s—others estimated the mid-40s. My brother bought me a Rohrbach’s, and my cousin laughed out a memory of how as kids we’d sneak into Dwyer after church and my dad would pitch us ball after ball. Almost 40 years later, this little stadium is still larger than all my imaginings. ■

THE *NEW YORK TIMES* BESTSELLER

“Andrew Bacevich speaks truth to power, no matter who’s in power, which may be why those of both the left and right listen to him.”—BILL MOYERS



© alman Zabarsky

“This compact, meaty volume ought to be on the reading list of every candidate for national office in November’s elections. In an age of cant and baloney,

Andrew Bacevich offers a bracing slap of reality.”

—THE WASHINGTON POST

“Bacevich takes aim at America’s culture of exceptionalism and scores a bull’s eye. He reminds us that we can destroy all that we cherish by pursuing an illusion of indestructibility.”

—LT. GEN. BERNARD E. TRAINOR USMC (Ret.),
co-author of *The General’s War* and *Cobra II*

“Compelling.”—LOU DOBBS

“Elegantly written . . . Refreshingly uncontaminated by the conventional wisdom of Washington, D.C.”—THE ECONOMIST

<http://us.macmillan.com/thelimitsofpower>



Metropolitan Books

An imprint of Henry Holt and Company